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THE TEACHER'S ALLIES

A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

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TO

MARGARET AND IAN

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THE TEACHER'S ALLIES

A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

CHAPTER I

THE TWOFOLD PROBLEM OF THE TEACHER

IN approaching the problem of religious education, one is faced with a difficulty similar to that which has exercised the minds of educationists since the days of Plato and Aristotle. All agree that education must have a definite place in the scheme of life ; but there is no consensus of opinion as to what purpose education should fulfil. Should teachers aim at making good citizens ? Or should they attempt to fit our children for their vocation in life ? Should they make it the purpose in education to help the growing generation to realise themselves—to develop their capacities, their manipulative ability, their intelligence ? No sooner do we ask those questions, or others like them, than we find ourselves set the task of finding a meaning to life itself. If we say that the purpose of education is to make good citizens, we are at once confronted with the problem of the kind of State of which we desire to make them good citizens ; a good citizen in a Bolshevist State must be very

different from a citizen in a State ruled by a Constitutional Monarchy. Vocation presents us with the onus of proving that vocation is the whole of life. And if we urge that we cannot go wrong if we aim at helping the child to realise himself, we must be able to answer the question as to what kind of a self we should like him to realise. Try to define the purpose of education and you will find, as Principal Jacks has reminded us, that "the innermost meaning of the universe itself" has to be probed.

Difficulty of defining Education

How difficult the question is may be judged from the remarks of Sir Auckland Geddes to the Minnesota Education Association in 1920: "The problem is simply this: What is education? Let me assure you that I find the answer extraordinarily difficult. I have tried for years to answer it; I have read deeply and widely on the subject, but I am not satisfied that I have yet found an answer."

Psychology and the Function of Education

This constitutes the first problem that meets all teachers who take their vocation seriously: What is to be our aim in teaching? What purpose in the life of the community are we fulfilling by our efforts? On the answer to these questions depends the joy we shall get from the work. If we become weary in well-doing, it is because we have not seen our work as "well-doing." That interest in teaching may be sustained, and that the teaching itself may add to

our lives, we need to have some kind of consciousness of the purpose we serve.

Now this is the problem that psychology cannot solve. Psychology may be able to say whether any particular theory of education is likely to ignore important elements in human nature ; but the value of any particular theory of education to life as a whole is a question on which psychology, as such, can pass no judgment. Nevertheless, although psychology cannot define the ideal of education, or pronounce a verdict on the various educational ideals, it is by no means barren even in relation to the purpose of education. Whatever ideal of education we may accept, it must be in accordance with the underlying psychological " principles upon which a right ideal must be determined." Psychology finds in human nature " an urge to completeness," and this urge is only satisfied when the self is being realised, when there is inner unity and freedom, when the instincts, desires, ambitions, and motives are in harmony with one's moral ideals. Any type of education which aims at repressing some aspect of our nature must stand condemned. Educational theory must wait, then, on psychological theory of human nature. If Madame Montessori lays stress upon the " principle of freedom," it is because she believes that through freedom in the classroom the scholar will attain to that freedom in which human nature realises itself. When Sir Auckland Geddes defines education as " The process designed to help a being to appreciate God, to know himself and to understand the spirit of the age in which he lives, so that he can live in, serve, and act with and on the community in which his lot is

cast," it is because he believes that in communion with God and in the service of the community a man realises himself. Every educational theory is based on some theory of human nature ; that is, on some kind of psychology. And the problem of teachers is to find some kind of an ideal through which they believe the scholars will realise themselves. The ideal, however, in which we may find completeness is a problem for philosophy and not psychology.

Religious Education

It might seem that if the problem of defining the purpose of education in general has proved such a stumbling-block, the difficulty will be greater when we turn to the purpose of religious education. For many years religious education in the day schools has been a bone of contention among religious bodies ; and the difficulties have been by no means surmounted. In spite of this, however, I believe the function of religious instruction can be defined in such a way as to command much more agreement than a definition of education in general. The psychologist, as such, is not primarily interested in the particular religious doctrines of any church or sect ; it is the religious experience itself as that affects behaviour which calls for his study. Just as he is unable to pronounce judgment on the validity of moral ideals, so he is unable, as a psychologist, to discriminate between this belief or that. Indeed, it cannot be too often emphasised that although psychology may be able to account for the almost universal belief, say, in God or immortality, it has no means of proving or disproving

these beliefs. Psychology only deals with processes; when it has shown how some belief arose, it cannot pass on to pronounce judgment as to whether that belief is true or false. It can tell us how the belief in God was acquired, but what the nature of God is, what His relation is to men, these are questions for spheres of thought other than psychology.

Does this mean that psychology can be of little help to us in the problem as to whether religion should be taught to the growing child? Can it not tell us whether the religious experience is a real and necessary experience in the complete life? Psychology leaves us in no doubt as to the answer to this question. Just as the psychologist would say without hesitation that some kind of education is necessary if the child is to grow mentally and morally, so he would assert that some kind of religious instruction is necessary if he is to grow spiritually; and spiritual growth is of the essence of the complete life. The whole problem of education from this point of view is to transmute the original self of the instincts into a moral and spiritual self; and not until this is done can we say that the self is realised. Hence the religious experience is fundamental. It is not something that merely happens; it is a definite need in human life, as we shall see later. There can be no completeness without it.

All this will be better understood if we try to grasp what the function of religious education is.

Function of Religious Education

In a very delightful volume on *Religion and Religious Instruction*, by Professor Campagnac of Liverpool Uni-

versity, he tells us that it was written " to suggest to teachers that their main function was to rediscover and to restore to its just authority—Religion." He felt when he wrote, what many more feel to-day, that there is great need for the deepening of the sense of obligation. He seems to imply that no earthly society or State can be finally authoritative for the individual, or claim his whole allegiance. Where then shall we look for some final authority that can claim " my life, my soul, my all " ? He thinks that our final authority " may take the form of a ' Kingdom of Heaven ' or of a ' City of God,' a society which recognises no frontiers of time or of place, but has room within its mild and universal empire for those who find within themselves room also for it. . . . This ebb and flow, this outgoing and return, between the Infinite in which all men have their being and the Infinite which is the individual life—this, too, is obligation. But it is also Freedom ; and the common name in which these two ideas are united in equality, each giving significance to the other, is Religion."

We need not stop to discuss Professor Campagnac's interesting definition of religion. What interests us here is the demand for the strengthening of the sense of obligation ; and the conclusion that only the rediscovery and restoration of religion to its just place can give the needed authority.

I doubt whether it would be possible to find a finer definition of the function of religious education. What function can it have other than to help the child to give religion its rightful authority in his life ? For, whatever their particular religious views, all would agree that religion should occupy the central place in

life. Looked at from the inner or psychological aspect, religion is an attitude, a disposition actively to attend and respond to God as believed in. In the truly religious man, this attitude determines his attitude to life itself; and is always found to direct his behaviour according to what he believes to be God's will. He finds completeness in fulfilling that Will, and happiness and peace in becoming adjusted to that Will. Religion is not bare knowledge of God or Christ; it is an active subjective attitude which to the religious man is the source of his deepest satisfactions, the inspiration of his deepest and highest desires, and the centre from which he acts.

This, then, is the function of religious education—to help the child to acquire the attitude to God which becomes central and authoritative in his life. Religious instruction, whether in the day school or the Sunday school, is never a mere matter of imparting knowledge of the Kings of Judah, or the missionary journeys of St. Paul, or of seeing that the children can repeat the Beatitudes or the Commandments. Necessary as all this is, we do more than this. Unconsciously the child is taking his own attitude to religion and all that religion stands for from the *manner* in which we are giving him "religious knowledge." As a matter of fact, religion as just defined cannot be taught. What the Bible teaches about God, what Christ did, what meanings men have given to the Old Testament and the doctrines that have gathered about the Person and Work of Christ, can be taught; but religion itself as a personal relation or attitude to God or Christ which we ourselves take or experience, that cannot be taught. That attitude the child acquires un-

consciously ; and he acquires it very largely from the *manner* in which religious knowledge is imparted. All this, however, we shall see later. Meantime, it is enough to grasp the fact that the function of religious education is to help the child to give the rightful place and authority to religion in his life. When this rightful authority is given, then the religious attitude will in due season become conscious ; it will become a religious sentiment, a " permeating tendency amid the mass of emotions, desires, and motives," and the whole life will be directed from this habitual centre.

Nothing less than this I believe to be the function of religious education. Religion is not like music, art, mathematics, or any other accomplishment we may acquire at school or university. At most, these are but partial interests ; they minister to the life ; but religion becomes our attitude to life itself. It is the most comprehensive interest we can acquire ; and yet it is more than an interest. It will give its legitimate place to every other interest, but will brook no rivals for chief place. And this is because religion is not a theory about God, but an attitude to God ; it is not a theory of reality, but an experience of reality.

The Practical Problem

We are now able to take up the second problem that confronts the teacher ; this is the psychological problem proper. It is the practical problem—the problem of the classroom. Granted that the function of the teacher is to help the child to acquire the religious attitude, and to give religion its rightful place in his life, how is this to be done ? It is really this question

which the volume is meant to answer. Psychology, as we have shown, can justify us in saying that religion ought to be central in life ; and although it cannot tell us what we are to teach about God, Christ, Atonement, Incarnation, Immortality, the Church, and Sacraments—for these the teacher must needs wait upon the theologian—it can help us to get these ideas home to the growing mind. Although religion is not knowledge about God, it always presupposes some kind of knowledge of Him ; and it comes finally to rest on some kind of ideas concerning His relation to the individual and society. Religion is never a bare attitude ; it implies an object and a belief in that object. The religious attitude is compatible with varied beliefs about God and His relation to us, but it is never found without some kind of beliefs. Nevertheless, religion is not the beliefs ; but the beliefs are not seldom the gateway to the experience itself.

In so far as religious instruction involves the imparting of knowledge, the process will differ little from the ordinary psychological processes discussed in any volume dealing with the psychology of education. Here the psychologist will help us to understand the native interests of the child, and how to these interests we attach the knowledge we desire to impart. How the attentive process is captured and held, how ideas become associated—all this comes under psychology of education in general. The teacher is not without allies even in dealing with uninteresting subjects ; indeed, it is only as we understand the child mind and ally ourselves with its laws and interests that we can successfully instil the knowledge of any subject.

The psychology of religious education, however,

differs in some respects from psychology of education in general. The problem here is not merely to get home a knowledge of religion, but to make religion the central, authoritative element in life. The teacher of religion cannot be satisfied to impart knowledge. He is like an advocate in front of a jury; he is pleading for a verdict. He aims at touching the will; at the rooting of emotional attitudes that will direct the whole life; at organising the whole inner life around the religious sentiment. In a word, religious education takes into account the psychological development of the child much more than general education. It is true that all educationists to-day lay stress on the moral and spiritual aim of education; and most would contend that its function can only be stated in spiritual terms. Nevertheless, it is the function of religious education to be nothing else than spiritual in its aim. It not merely sets itself to create character, but a certain type of character; it not merely attempts to give knowledge, but to create a definite attitude to that knowledge. Hence it looks for its allies amongst the emotions and dispositions, rather than amongst the intellectual processes. We must not confuse between psychological and mental development; and it is on the former that the religious educationist must depend.

Mental Development and Psychological Development

It will not be out of place to say something about the difference between mental development and psychological development. It is on the latter that

the fruit of religious education depends ; and, although all education makes for psychological development, our educational systems lay the emphasis consciously or unconsciously on mental development.

By mental development is meant the training, directing, and development of the child's intelligence ; *i.e.* his capacity for perception, attention, memory, imagination, reasoning, which latter would include the power of analytic comparison, generalisation, and inference. If we were to glance at the various " intelligence tests " advocated to-day, we should find that they are constructed to measure the child's intellectual powers, and his motor and manipulative ability. Such tests are applied almost universally in America ; and in our own country we have such authorities on these tests as Professor Cyril Burt and Professor Spearman. None of these tests, however, helps us to determine the character of the growing child, his ability to find happiness, or what Professor Hobhouse has called " harmony of experience with feeling." One may be intellectually brilliant and withal anything but psychologically developed or happy. This is what is implied by those lines of Kingsley's to be found in almost every autograph book :

" Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever."

I do not suppose Kingsley thought that there is any antithesis between goodness and cleverness ; what he meant was that cleverness is not the same as goodness. According to a well-known story, a French professor is reported to have said that his prizeman in Ethics, the science of conduct, was the most immoral student in the university ! A man may be mentally well

developed, and morally and psychologically little older than a child. Able to solve or to tackle the most abstruse of intellectual problems, he may be so timid that he dare not travel alone, sleep in the dark, or face some trying crisis. He may be intellectually brilliant and yet a " divided self," lacking the power of decision, with little or no will-power. Such a person is psychologically undeveloped ; his psychological self is unrealised, and therefore happiness, joy, and peace are beyond his reach. Psychological growth implies the development of the instinctive and emotional dispositions, the adjustment to the three fundamental realities of life—Society, Sex, and God. This does not mean that the instincts have to be exercised anyhow ; but exercised by objects that are compatible with his own moral standards. Instincts, emotions, conscience, and reason will be working in harmony. Hence psychological development means *self-realisation* ; the whole self is involved. For the self to be realised, motives that unify the life must dominate ; interests that are comprehensive must be acquired. It is not a mere case, as some writers seem to imply, of exercising the instincts and emotions ; they must be exercised by objects and interests that are in harmony with our moral standards. It is our interests that create our attitudes to the fundamental realities of life ; and it is these attitudes that determine whether we shall realise ourselves.

The Teacher's Problems

We can now see more clearly the twofold problem of the teacher. What is to be our aim in teaching ?

What attitudes are we to help the child to acquire? Which of these attitudes shall we make central and dominant? What knowledge is necessary in order that the child may acquire these determining attitudes?

Having answered these questions, we have to ask how psychology helps us to attain our object. What innate interests does the child have at the various periods of life — infancy, childhood, puberty, adolescence? What are the mental processes lying behind various kinds of behaviour? How does the child come to believe in God? How does he come to experience religious emotions? What leads him to take up moral attitudes to life? How does he attain a religious character? If the object of religious education is to give the child religious knowledge, and through that knowledge to gain a religious attitude to life, have the teachers any allies in their task? These are the problems which the psychology of religious education ought to help us to answer.

CHAPTER II

THE TEACHER'S ALLIES

PROBABLY no exhortation is so frequently given to teachers as: "Make your lesson interesting." As a matter of actual psychological fact, that is just what the teachers cannot do. What we can do is to interest our scholars in the lesson we have to give. But this is a very different thing from searching in journals and story-books for little anecdotes or illustrations which appeal to us, and which may be very remote either from the natural interests of the child or the main lesson we wish to get home. No doubt the child is interested in stories, etc.; but our object is not to interest him in the story but in the lesson. But more of this anon.

At present I am concerned to rid the reader's mind of the fallacy that he can give an interesting lesson. I am not engaged in writing an interesting book; it is more than probable that some will look at the book and vote it very dry. If it was the book that was interesting, then every one should find it so. Nevertheless, I am hoping to arouse the interest of teachers in this small volume. But the interest will be in them. If by a figure of speech, it is said, the volume is interesting, this simply means that I shall have helped them to envisage the problems of their work more clearly, or aided them in some felt problem, or

assisted them to understand the child mind in which they are already interested.

Psychology of Interest

It is well for us here to understand the psychology of interest. The teacher's allies are very largely the interests, innate or acquired, of the child mind. To excite these is to interest the child and secure his attention, and at the same time so to strengthen the interests by exercise that they will control his impulses and behaviour.

Dr. Drever, in his *Psychology of Education*, has pointed out the tendency to confuse the two meanings of the word "interest." "Interest," he says, "may refer to *experience* or to *disposition*, to the conscious or unconscious." An illustration will bring out the distinction. We go to church and hear a sermon, and afterwards some one says that it was an "interesting sermon"; we meet an "interesting" gentleman or lady in a café or at a party. What is the meaning of "interest" in these connections? It refers to an "experience"—an experience which is conscious, which we enjoyed; it affected us pleasantly; and if we analyse it further we may find that it was worth while, or had some specific value for us—"we would not have missed it for anything," as we say.

But we speak of men or women as being "interested" in cricket, in the Church, in wireless, in missionary enterprise, in science, etc. What is the meaning of "interest" here? Obviously it is quite different from the meaning we have just discussed. However much we are interested in cricket or the Church, we are not

always thinking about the Church or cricket. In other words, we may be interested in something even when we are not having any experience relating to that particular interest. *An interest* in this sense refers to " a structural feature of the mind itself ; to a disposition." It is never conscious, but is the cause of the pleasantly toned feelings which we experience if the interest is excited. It is in this sense we use the word when we urge teachers to create desirable interests in their pupils. The conscious interest is transitory, fleeting ; it passes as we pass to other things. But the unconscious interest is permanent or may be permanent.

The vital thing about this distinction is that it helps us to realise that we cannot have the conscious interest unless already there is in the make-up of the mind itself " interests." If some one in the train mentions tennis, and some one else pricks up his ears, and pays attention to what is being said, it is simply because this unconscious disposition has been aroused spontaneously by the conversation. There will be other people in the carriage, in all probability, who wish the tennis enthusiast would hold his tongue ; they are anxious to get the ear of the carriage for their pet theory on how to reduce taxation ; there will be others who are quite unconscious that the tennis enthusiast has spoken ; they are wrapped up in their own thoughts, their own cares, etc.

On the other hand, we must be careful to note that even our permanent interests cannot always be aroused. If the focus of attention is occupied by some interest, other interests even more important will be excluded, as, for example, when some primary instinct has been

aroused by temptation and refuses to be displaced. Again interests which have been instilled in childhood may be overlaid by acquired interests of the later years.

Vital Elements in Interest

From what has been said, three things must be kept in mind if we are to understand and create or use interests. First, interest always implies activity in some object, idea, person, etc. It is dynamic. To take interest is to have the mind and often the body busying itself with the object that is interesting. If I am interested in psychology, I cannot help studying some recent theory about the mind or the processes behind behaviour. I may be so interested as to sacrifice some other pleasure in order thoroughly to understand the new theory; I may forgo some other necessity in order to buy the books pertaining to the theory. I cannot be indifferent to it.

Second, interest is objective. Here we look at interests as the objects which call forth the energy, which arouse the attention. A man may be interested in the Church, in public work, in the Sunday school, etc. As Professor Dewey puts it: "Interest does not end simply in itself, as bare feelings may, but always has some object, end, or aim to which it attaches itself."

The third thing about interest, according to Dewey, is that it is subjective. Here is the conscious side of interest already mentioned: the emotional side as contrasted with the dynamic and objective sides. We cannot be interested without having some kind of feeling, not necessarily pleasant. One may be interested in slums, and show his interest in them

by the feeling of aversion they arouse and the activity he puts forth to clear them.

Significance of Interest

The significance of this brief description of interest lies in the light with which it illuminates the twofold problem of the teacher. We can now see something of the psychological nature of our task. To make religion the central authority in a life is to create an abiding interest in God and all that pertains to religion. In virtue of that interest a man shall be joyfully active in understanding God, His revelation in Christ, His relation to himself, in furthering whatever he believes to be God's purpose. The interest will not be a bare feeling of respect for religion, nor a bare attitude to God; it will be dynamic. General and specific activities will be sustained, tendencies contrary to the interest will be spontaneously inhibited to the degree in which it is rooted, and the mind will tend to organise its content round this controlling interest.

Looked at from the objective side, God, His Will, His Kingdom, His Grace, His Christ, His Church, His Purposes, will continually tend to call forth our energy or active interest. While in virtue of the subjective element the activity, whether mental or physical, in which the religious self goes out will always be pleasantly toned. It cannot be anything else, for an interest is just a channel of self-expression, and all self-expression is pleasant.

But the study of interest not only illuminates our task as teachers, it helps us to understand how that task can be fulfilled. From this point of view we

may look at interests as both ends and means. Desirable interests in the scholar are just what the teacher works for. But though they are the ends the teacher has in view, they do not end in themselves; they become the means by which ever larger interests are created; they are the sources on which the teacher depends for attention. We cannot get attention for any idea absolutely new; it must be attached to the old. Hence for both the teacher's problems, interests are fundamentally important.

CHAPTER III

THE TEACHER'S ALLIES—NATIVE AND ACQUIRED INTERESTS

IN the preceding chapters we have tried to grasp what the problems of the teacher are. We have seen that his function is to help the child to acquire a religious interest that will become the controlling and directing authority in the growing life; and that the task of the teacher will be to work through the already existing interests in the child mind so as to link the child's self-expressive activities with the religious interest we desire to instil.

Innate Interests

Now what are the "already existing interests" through which we have to work? In children of school age there are two kinds of interests—innate and acquired. The first, as the term implies, the child brings with him into the world; the second are those which the child has acquired in contact with his whole environment. We do not, for example, have to teach a child to play. We may teach him particular games, but the tendency to play is innate. On the other hand, different children like different games; but there is no need to premise that the child was born with a specific liking, say, for tennis or football.

He acquired the interest in tennis while his brother took to football. In the same way the child is born with an instinct of curiosity ; this makes him interested in anything novel or strange. But here, again, different children acquire an interest in different subjects which stimulate their curiosity to know more about them. All the child has is a capacity to play, or to be curious ; the environment will determine what games the child is likely to play, or in what subjects he is likely to become interested.

It is in virtue of these instinctive interests that the child becomes interested in his environment, and reacts to it in general or specific ways. Through them he goes out to meet his world, and his world comes into him. In virtue of them he internalises his world, and thus experiences his world. As Drever has pointed out, we are very apt to think of our experience of life "as a kind of effect produced upon us by an external world acting through our sense organs, we ourselves being regarded as passive recipients of the experience." The truth is that we react to environment in virtue of active interests which select for us the objects, persons, or ideas that shall be attended to, and that shall determine our responses. When we shrink from pain, for example, it is not because the sense organ shrinks, but because the pain arouses our innate interest in the preservation of our organism, and thus reacts so as to escape danger.

Interests are Dynamic

Hence these instinctive interests which initiate us into the experience of life are dynamic in their nature.

As they mature they determine that we *shall* be interested in the objects that satisfy them ; they crave for satisfaction. If repressed, they find a mental or physical escape which leads to a failure to become adjusted to life's realities. Their repression or perversion is the root of functional nervous disorders and abnormal behaviour. *No one should undertake religious education of the young unless he realises that religion does not mean the repression of our instinctive nature but its control through the linkage of the instincts with satisfactions that help to transmute the instinctive self into a moral and spiritual self.* Religion, as the central and guiding authority in life, sweeps the energy of the instinctive interests into larger interests in which the whole self is realised and unified.

How Interests are Aroused

If now we try to grasp the manner in which these instinctive interests are aroused and how their arousal affects the mind and behaviour, we shall the better understand what is their significance for religious education, and what real allies the teacher has in them.

Take *curiosity*, for example. When a child sees something which he cannot comprehend, he begins to *wonder* what the thing can be ; timidly, perhaps, if it is a very strange object, he approaches it, examines it, and tries to interpret it by what he already knows. When he sees its likeness to something else, or sees that it is just another form of something he knows already, his wonder disappears, and in its place comes

a sense of satisfaction in his knowledge. But if he cannot place it, his wonder continues to occupy his consciousness, and under its influence he will examine the object more closely or run with it to his mother and ask all sorts of questions ; his wonder will not let him rest until he knows what the object is. But though his wonder keeps him restless, it is pleasant in itself and involves him in pleasant activity—activity in which he is expressing himself. Take the little child who has just begun to crawl. How quickly he explores his surroundings! Or, better still, take the little child in the country. He begins to explore round the cottage, down by the stream ; and if there are hills he will feel wonder as to what lies beyond, and his imagination may picture all sorts of creatures and things ; and out of this there may come a passionate desire to see for himself.

We can see that it is the restless questioning feeling that is important for us here, with its consequent urge in the child to go and see for himself. His feeling sustains and reinforces his activity until the object is understood ; but the feeling passing out into activity gives a pleasant experience which is conscious. The wonder in itself would not complete the pleasant experience : it becomes completed in the activity.

Before we touch the importance of curiosity for religion, let us look at one or two more of the instinctive interests that are important for religious education.

Imitation has always held a large place in the instincts on which learning depends. Imitation is at the

basis of learning games, manners, drill, and many other social activities. *For religion, imitation is important because it leads to the first experiences of the religious feelings.* When a child imitates the reverent attitude of mother or father there is an innate tendency to experience the emotion of reverence. This is the outcome of the fact that any bodily activity tends to generate the corresponding emotional feeling. Smile into a looking-glass and you will have a tendency to feel *smiley* inside ; look glum and you will be astonished how soon you begin to feel glum. The " New Thoughters " have exploited this tendency to the full. Without pushing it too far, there can be no doubt, I think, that Professor Pratt is near the truth when he says : " So close is the relation between reaction and feeling, between bodily expression and inner state, that he who imitates another's act, posture, or expression, is likely to share at least incipiently in the mental attitude thus expressed. Here we have one of the most subtle, far-reaching, and long-enduring of all influences that mould the religion of the child." Again he says : " It is more important that the child should imitate actions which are expressive of religious feelings and thus come to wonder, think, and feel for himself, than that he should learn any amount of pious words."

Emulation is another strong instinctive interest that plays an important part in religious training. Imitation has no motive. But in emulation we imitate with the motive of not being inferior. Thus emulation has all the advantages of imitation, but just because it is conscious, it may have even more far-reaching effects.

Another instinctive interest is the *Desire for Recognition.* Usually self-display is called an instinct. But I have come to the conclusion that self-display is really one of the ways by which the innate desire for recognition attempts to realise itself. Probably the first sign of this desire is that the child loves to be noticed. I doubt if there is any self-display behind which there is no other motive than itself. When a child says, "Watch me do this," he really wishes to be thought amusing or clever or praiseworthy. There is always a motive. That motive, I believe, is the desire for recognition. If I may put it in unacademical terms, it is the innate desire to be thought somebody. It lies behind ambition, pride, and much of our social behaviour. Like all other instinctive interests it is not in itself wrong ; it may be perverted. Nevertheless, without it personality and many of the finer activities would be impossible. A plant does not go about seeking moisture, but without moisture it dies. It is exactly the same with the child, and even the man who is still active socially. While they do not consciously seek recognition or praise, they are, nevertheless, sustained by it. The desire for recognition "includes a return of sympathy and affection," and I may add appreciation. As Professor Giddings has put it: "When a person perceives that his acquaintance resembles himself in mind and character, and is conscious of a certain sympathy and affection for his acquaintance, he looks for some manifestation of interest in himself. He expects the acquaintance also to recognise the points of similarity and to show feelings of sympathy and liking."

This Desire for Recognition, or to be thought somebody, is closely allied with the instinct of *Self-assertion*. When a child's curiosity and wonder have made him investigate something strange or novel, and he is able to place it, the emotion of wonder disappears. But the child experiences another emotion if he has placed it by his own intelligence. He has a positive self-feeling in his own achievement. When he overcomes difficulties with the material with which he is building a house or whatever it be, again he has this feeling. It is one of the pleasantest of emotions because of the self-elation felt. Professor M'Dougall identifies self-assertion with self-display, and is thus tied down to the thesis that it is only active in the presence of spectators. But self-assertion is more than self-display, and need not be motived by desire for recognition. It involves the tendency to stamp our own character on our environment to make use of things and persons for our own purposes without necessary reference to what others think. It is behind the great efforts of propagandists, and the uphill climb of many a man whose initial advantages for the battle of life were scant. It is the urge of the self to impress itself; it is in reality the innate urge *to be somebody*. It is not selfish, though it may be swept into selfish purposes. Uncontrolled by other tendencies, it may become arrogance and ruthlessness, but it is not in itself ruthless or arrogant.

Over against this tendency with its interest in *Self-achievement* there is the tendency of *Self-abasement*, with its negative self-feeling or subjection. It is a tendency to feel "small" in the presence of any one or anything superior. A learned man may not feel a

bit nervous when discussing his theories with another student, but let him address a body of men his equals and he becomes nervous. Be introduced to some one of high rank and you feel embarrassed. Go to a fashionable dinner and use the fish-knives for the wrong food, and your evening will be spoiled by appearing and feeling small.

This feeling is the root of humility, the basis of meekness or teachableness. It gives one a healthy sense of his limitations, and in so far as its arousal is healthy, it may excite the self-assertive tendency to overcome the limitations in a normal manner.

Another instinctive interest which plays a part in the acquirement of religion is *Self-preservation.* The desire here is to avoid or escape danger. The emotion is that of fear. The late Dr. Rivers has given us the best analysis of this tendency. We may respond to danger in various ways. We may take to our heels under the impulse generated by fear ; we may collapse if all ways of escape are closed, or if we think they are closed ; we may become aggressive and attempt to overcome the object. But we must not think of danger merely in the sense of something physical ; nor of self-preservation as referring to the physical organism alone. Fear is aroused in face of danger to one's reputation, prospects, faith, or anything belonging to the self. Indeed, not a few neurotics are just afraid of themselves, afraid of their ability to withstand temptation, or to face the realities of life. Fear is probably the most extensive emotion we possess, and may be aroused by anything that spells danger to the self.

It is worthy of note here, as Professor McDougall has pointed out, that not the least excitant of fear is the unfamiliar and unknown. "Whatever is totally strange or violently opposed to the accustomed and familiar is apt to excite fear both in men and in animals, if only it is capable of attracting their attention."

Two other interests we may mention before we discuss the question of a religious instinct. The first is the innate tendency to seek love and to be loved. We have an innate interest in loving and being loved. As a rule, this tendency is classed with the instincts relating to sex, although Dr. Pfister speaks of "the love instincts." It is doubtless true that sexual phenomena are involved in some aspects of this tendency, but it is just as certain that there are aspects in which this is not the case. A man may seek a male friend without having a homosexual tendency; and it is by no means a proved fact that the child's tendency to seek or give love has always definite sexual wishes accompanying it. Pfister defines love as "a feeling of attraction and a sense of self-surrender, arising out of a need, and directed towards an object that offers hope of gratification." That the reproductive impulse is closely associated with this tendency is not to be denied; indeed, I believe that, from the biological point of view, it was out of the need for gratification here, there arose the possibility of love sentiments. Be all that as it may, I believe with Pfister that a great deal of the failure to realise a complete life, apart altogether from sexual gratification, is due to the non-satisfaction of this innate need to love and be beloved. The desire for recog-

nition is nowhere so satisfied as in love ; and to be loved will compensate for lack of recognition in other ways.

Finally, we must give attention to our instinctive interest in the social group and the herd as a whole. This is an interest that motives behaviour to a very great extent. That the herd should have an abiding and unescapable interest for each one of us is not difficult to understand. It is within the group that our profoundest instincts get the means of satisfaction. It is their behaviour the child imitates ; from the herd, or to be more accurate his social group, he attempts to extract the recognition which is one of his deepest motives ; it is within the group that he finds often the escape from his fears ; and towards the group as a whole, or specific members of it, his love instincts go out.

To Wilfrid Trotter we owe the analysis of this instinct. Here we can do no more than point out the two main ways in which the herd instinct determines our behaviour. First of all we find an innate tendency to be *in the group*. We are gregarious creatures. We love the crowd. Think of the crowded seaside resorts in summer ; of the multitudes of young and old alike who parade the streets in the evenings or in holiday time. It is true that a great many people choose the quietest of places in the country for their vacations or walks ; but this is no argument against the universal tendency to seek the group. All it shows is that some people like a smaller group rather than a larger. What one must grasp is that the possession of this tendency, as McDougall has pointed out, does not imply any strong sociability. " Many a man leads in London

a most solitary, unsociable life, who yet would find it hard to live far away from the thronged city. Such men are like Galton's oxen—unsociable but gregarious."

But this gregarious tendency is the lesser aspect of the interest in the herd. The instinctive tendency proper has for its function not the preservation or progress of the individual as such, but the preservation of the herd itself and its homogeneity. Looked at from the point of view of the individual's interest, the gregarious tendency opens up doors through which he may go to an ever-increasing life; it is both the means of the satisfaction of his instinctive life and of his moral life; it is the arena in which he transmutes his instinctive self into a moral self and realises his personality. But looked at from the point of view of preserving the homogeneity of the herd it influences man's behaviour in numberless ways.

In virtue of this tendency, the individual has an innate interest in being not only *in* the herd, but *of* the herd. He wants its warm approval for his opinions; if he cannot get it he will seek out some small group into whose sympathetic ears he will pour his ideas and get the approval he seeks. We are comfortable only among those who are like-minded with us; hence the segregation into classes, each distinguished by the cherishing of certain types of opinion; for example, religious denominations, political parties, social cliques, etc. There is nothing to which we are so susceptible as herd opinion. A young man goes from a good home to the university, and there meets with a fast set. He at once finds in himself a tendency to relax his moral views in

order to be *of* the group. He shrinks from being thought different, goody-goody, "pi," etc. And unless he has a strong individuality he may be unable to withstand the silent pressure of the herd upon him.

Sometimes this aspect of the herd instinct is spoken of as though it were the external pressure of the group that changed or influenced us. But it is just as true to say that the pressure is exerted by our own innate interest to be of the group, to get its approval, to be accepted by it as part of it. The individual has a horrible fear of being thought inferior, or of social ostracism.

It is here, too, that we find suggestibility manifesting itself strongly. We have all an innate tendency to accept anything uncritically that is uttered by some one superior to ourselves. The child's suggestibility to the opinions of his home group, then to his school group, and his teachers is very noticeable. But even the oldest are susceptible to the uncritical acceptance of the opinions of their own group and of society as a whole. Most of us hold religious, political, social, and other opinions which we have accepted uncritically from our group; and we are apt to fight for these views as though we were experts who had spent a lifetime in building up and justifying our beliefs. In virtue of this herd pressure and our own instinctive shrinkage from isolation we are born conservatives, and distrust the new ideas; but once the herd gives its adherence to a new view, we as quickly find means of accepting it. The herd, as such, always suspects any one who differs from the generally accepted in belief or conduct.

Perhaps nowhere can we see the effect of herd pressure so well as in the history of science. Any scientific theory that ran counter to the customary views on religion or conduct was suspect and often condemned. The result has been that the sciences which made most progress have been those which least affected man's sensibilities. Physics, mathematics, astronomy, and chemistry got a good start on biology, psychology, and sociology, because the latter threatened to upset the long-cherished opinions of the herd. Take the outcry about the new psychology because it is laying bare sources of conduct that the herd likes to keep in the dark; take the application of scientific historical methods to the interpretation of the Bible, and one can see the tenacity of the herd in holding views whose rational basis they do not like to consider. It was the herd views that crucified Christ, stoned Stephen, burned witches, and perpetuated the lack of equal opportunity.

Nevertheless, the conservative influence exerted by the herd has a real function both in society and in individual lives. Were it not for this steadying influence, much that has been of value might be lost in hasty changes. Though it often holds up progress, it ensures that progress will be evolutional rather than revolutional.

In regard to the individual, the pressure of the herd and our susceptibility to its opinions make it possible for us to absorb at an incredible speed whatever wisdom has been garnered from experience. Life is too short to prove everything that is necessary for life. And if it is true that herd pressure is apt

to submerge individuality, on the other hand it helps us to restrain and control the instinctive tendencies until such time as they can be indulged in ways that make for character and stability. Herd pressure is one of the great forces of social control, and guards us against our own selfish and individualistic tendencies.

Instinctive Interests and the Teacher

Now a knowledge of these instinctive tendencies or interests has a twofold value to the teacher. In the first place, there is no other way of capturing the attention of children in the schoolroom except through these instinctive interests, and the acquired interests that have become allied with them. *To excite an instinctive interest is to give a child something to attend with as well as something to attend to.* Arouse his curiosity and his attention will not flag until his wonder has disappeared; associate your lessons with the instinctive interest to which it should appeal, and you will not have a listless class. We have all to give lessons which do not naturally appeal to the child mind and which we feel he must get; can we not associate them with what is natively interesting to the child? Make him curious; make him emulative; give him an opportunity to be noticed; give him a chance of helping in the lesson. I can remember perfectly in the university a dry lecture on gravitation: the class was restless. Then the professor proceeded to illustrate how the centre of gravity changed, and what happened, by taking out a Nuremberg toy. At once the class was captured, and called again and

again for the toy to work. Our curiosity had been aroused.

But the end of teaching is not merely to keep attention, but to get the lesson home. We do not merely want to interest the child while in the classroom, but to secure that what we have taught may give him knowledge that will help to direct his behaviour and form his character. This means that we have to instil permanent interests. This is where the second value of knowing the instinctive interests enters. Ideals, permanent interests, and habits of behaviour cannot be instilled in antagonism to the instinctive interests without harm to the child. The problem of character is to attach the instinctive interests to objects that while satisfying them control them. There is nothing wrong with the instinctive interests; it is the behaviour in which they come to seek satisfaction that may be wrong. There is nothing wrong with a child's assertiveness even when he is "kicking on the floor until he gets it"; what is wrong is the manner in which he is asserting himself, getting his ends satisfied.

We must then associate instinctive satisfactions with ends that go beyond and yet include instinctive interests. Attach his instinctive interest in being taken notice of, his desire for recognition, his pleasure in the approval of his group, his self-assertion to objects that will further the common good, and his instinctive interests become moral; they become character; and they give the maximum of joy. "Begin," as Professor James says, "with the line of his native interests, and offer him objects that have immediate connection with these. . . . Next, step by step, connect with these first objects and experiences the later

objects and ideas which you wish to instil. Associate the new with the old in some natural and telling way, so that the interest being shed along from point to point finally suffuses the entire system of objects of thought."

CHAPTER IV

IS THERE A RELIGIOUS INSTINCT?

A GOOD deal of ingenuity has been exercised by writers on the psychology of religion on the problem as to whether the religious sentiment or religious interest is rooted in a religious instinct. Some recent books have taken for granted that psychologists are unanimous on the point. But this is not so. Professor Starbuck, *e.g.*, speaks of a deep-rooted religious instinct; and he is by no means alone in believing that there is an element in original human nature specifically religious, so that we cannot help becoming interested in religious objects. Others, again, give religion an instinctive basis, by referring it to one or other of our instinctive tendencies. Some have argued that our religious sentiment is based on the sex instinct, others that the root of religion is to be found in the herd instinct, etc.

The question is by no means easy of answer. What we are certain of is that a child is religious before he comes to us for direct religious teaching; the religious emotions are experienced long before the child can formulate any concrete ideas of God. But we are just as certain that there are many people to whom religion means little or nothing; in whom there seems to be no religious interest; and who certainly have no conscious religious experience or interest. I am not

now thinking of those who argue against religion, who tell us that it is "humbug"; these people are interested in religion, though it is in getting rid of it; but in all these cases it would be found that there is a motive conscious or unconscious behind their activities. Apart from these, however, there are multitudes in whom the attitude is indifference in the true sense of the term; religion fails to arouse any attention.

"Urge to Completeness"

On the other hand, the universality of the religious sentiment is such that many have thought that a characteristic so universal must have an innate basis in some specific tendency or disposition. Dr. Martineau used to argue that morality could not be reduced to non-moral elements; and I confess I find it very difficult to discover a purely natural basis for the fact that man "is incurably religious." Nevertheless, there is much to be said for Professor Pratt's position, "that given a being endowed with intelligence and with the dozen or more specific instincts and tendencies of man, such a being is bound to be religious, at least potentially, or incipiently." Given the innate interests in the strange, the mysterious, and unknown, the interest in recognition, the interest in loving and being loved, to say nothing of other interests, and it might seem that we need look no further for the basis of man's religious experience. There is, too, what is more fundamental than the individual instincts, namely, what Dr. Hadfield calls "the urge to completeness." "Fulness of life is the goal of life; the urge to completeness is the most compelling motive

of life." This, it seems to me, gives a much finer psychological basis for the religious sentiment than any specific instinct could give. The urge to completeness involves the whole man ; whereas an instinct but seeks its own satisfaction. And this is what religion demands ; it is to control the whole man. Indeed, it is only when it does so control that we get " a happy holiness."

Dr. Hadfield gives one or two very apt illustrations of this urge to completeness from the physiological side. He argues that we can see the motive working on every level of life. Let us borrow his illustration of an organism innately seeking health. " If you cut the limb of a newt, so strong is this impulse that the organism sets to work until it has grown a new limb and restored the newt to wholeness. If we inflict a wound on the body, immediately every part of the bodily organism sets to work to restore the injured part : the nervous system transmitting the signal of pain, the heart palpitating and driving blood to the wound to wash it clean, the glandular system actively producing white corpuscles and hurrying them to the spot to fight and expel in the form of pus the microbes which threaten the life ; fresh blood is brought up to form new tissue, until, at last, the wound is restored and the organism is whole again." Health, we can see, is the goal of the urge on the physiological side ; and on this urge the doctor depends in all therapeutic measures.

Urge to Moral Completeness

On the moral side we see something analogous working. The goal here is the realisation of what we

consciously or unconsciously have accepted as the moral ideal; conduct of which our moral consciousness approves. Let the conscientious man do something which he believes to be wrong, and at once he feels uneasy, guilty, and cannot rest until he has somehow made amends. But the urge here is not merely negative. It impels him to more strenuous endeavour to know the right, the just, and the true. The moral urge when healthy is always towards harmony; no repression is involved; each side of our nature is given its legitimate satisfaction. Instinctive cravings are not repressed because they are instinctive; but they are controlled when their satisfaction would be detrimental to the moral life as a whole. The authority of conscience, which one might call the organ of moral completeness, is derived from the fact that it legislates for the moral life as a whole; its function is to permeate the psychological side of our nature with the moral interest, *to transmute the instinctive self into a moral self.* Man is more than a bundle of instincts. The sense of "ought" is deeply planted in his being; and the sense of moral obligation is felt by all, though all do not feel the same obligations. We may, if we care, admit with McDougall that the child comes to do right at first by the fear of the consequences of doing wrong; but this would not account for the fact that we find on reflection—that there are things we "ought" to do, and things we ought not to do. Indeed, Dr. Macurdy has argued in his *Psychology of Emotion,* that the incest inhibition in man seems to be innate. Be that as it may, the sense of ought is ultimate, and lies at the back of the drive for moral completeness.

Urge to Psychological Completeness

On the psychological side, the urge is very obvious. The mind is always striving for some kind of unity; for harmony amongst the psychological elements of our being. Self-realisation, which is just another term for harmony or unity, is the goal here. A psychologically complete man would be one whose every desire, emotion, and instinct was organised within the sentiments—sentiments that are in harmony with his moral consciousness and his intelligence. Always the urge to completeness is towards some kind of unity.

If we go deeper still, we find that it is not merely the completeness of any single organ or isolated desire that is the aim of this urge to completeness. Health, we saw, is the aim on the physiological side. But health is not a matter of individual organs; it is an organic state. Absolute health, in the sense of the completeness of every organ, is not to be found. "Health," says Dr. W. Leslie Mackenzie, in his Home University volume on *Health and Disease*, "is the name we give to the total average of the highest physiological efficiency." In other words, health "is a normal balance of functions relative to a place in the world"; there will be enough organic harmony and balance amongst the various organs of the body as to allow regularity in the daily cycles of appetite, muscular action, excretion, and sleep. Balance and harmony, rather than physiological completeness of each individual organ, is the goal of the urge to completeness here. Similarly on the psychological side. It is not the freedom of exercise of every instinct that gives a man completeness, or realisation, but the harmony the

instincts have gained within the moral sentiments and rational control.

Innate Basis of Religious Sentiment

Now, given a being with an innate curiosity in the novel and strange, and that capacity to experience wonder until he is able to give meaning to whatever has excited his curiosity; given a being who, in virtue of his suggestibility, cannot help being influenced by others, with a tendency to imitate and emulate them, and to experience like emotions, with a tendency to love and be loved, then add to that his innate sense of moral obligation, and his rational nature which urges him to seek the reason of things, and we can see how the urge to completeness will work on the spiritual side. We shall be inwardly urged to seek to understand, to come into relation with, whatever lies behind the world of sense experience, and whatever will offer satisfaction to our deeper tendencies. Man's reach is always beyond his grasp. He is not satisfied to repeat some emotion he has experienced; he is always seeking some experience beyond what he has experienced. That is a psychological fact, and has to be accounted for. How better account for it psychologically than by the inference that the urge to completeness only finds satisfaction when the whole man rests on the Reason of things—God?

In this urge to completeness, it seems to me that we get a much stronger basis for the religious sentiment than the older idea of a religious instinct. The moral nature cannot help seeking completeness; but the content of perfection is ever being enlarged as the will

of God, or what is thought to be His will, comes to be known. Desire does not stop with repetition ; it is insatiable, and seeks ever greater satisfaction. The mind does not stop with its perceptions and its memories ; it is urged to greater knowledge by its creative imagination. The rational nature must find unity in its experience ; it can rest with nothing less. Completeness, every part of our complex nature seeks. Is it unreasonable to infer that that completeness is found in a consciousness of God, or a conscious relation to Him ? " We are restless until we rest in Thee."

Is there an Innate Specific Religious Disposition ?

And yet all that has been said gives no more than a purely natural basis for the religious sentiment ; it gives an instinctive and innate basis for religious sentiment without premising a specific religious instinct. The religious emotions on this basis are just compounds of the emotions we feel to other objects not religious. It is here, it seems to me, that we come to the real problem : Is the awe that we feel when confronted with some awe-inspiring spectacle no different from that which we feel in the presence of God, what we experience in a truly worshipful state of mind ? Is the love we have towards God no different from what we give to mother, child, etc. ? Or is there just a difference in degree, but in essence the same emotions ? Are the specific religious emotions unique, analogous to other emotions but not to be derived from them ? Have we a capacity, or disposition, in virtue of which we experience emotions towards God which we could not feel towards any other object of experience ?

Let me give an illustration. I find that in dealing with neurotic cases whose trouble is due to moral failure, there is a distinct difference in the emotions felt by the man who has been roused to anxiety about his wrong habit by the instinct of danger, and the emotions excited by conscience. What is more, the behaviour is different; that is to say, the reactions to the feelings are different in these two cases. Both men will say that it is the wrongness of the habit they feel; but on analysis, it is found that in the one case it is the fear of consequences that is felt; while the other is conscious of the disturbance in the moral and spiritual relationships of his life. It is the wrongness only which the latter realises; whereas the former mainly recognises the possible consequences to his organism, and the possible social consequences. I find that the method of cure is different in these cases; it is enough to help the latter to correct the habit; that does not seem to help the other, as he invariably represses the desire and it appears in another form. He must be helped to realise the wrongness of it before a cure can be effected.

Now the point of the illustration is that on the surface the emotions felt by both appear to be the same, but they are wholly different; they are analogous, and one may be illustrated by the other, but they can never be reduced to the same terms.

Dr. Otto's "Numinous Disposition"

The contention of Dr. Otto, in his epoch-making volume, *The Idea of the Holy*, is that the religious emotions of awe, dependence, etc., cannot be reduced

to the elements of the ordinary emotions of awe, dependence, etc. There is a something in religious awe, and the feeling of dependence on God, that is unique. Just as God cannot be expressed in terms of human personality, though we may be helped ourselves to grasp the idea of God by using such terms, so there is something in our specific religious emotions that cannot be expressed in the terms of emotions experienced by almost all.

Dr. Otto argues that we have a "numinous disposition," in virtue of which we realise that we are in the presence of God, or rather of a Being other than ourselves, and through which we experience the specific religious emotions. There is a feeling that we are in the presence of a supernatural Being, before whom we feel our creature-hood and religious awe and reverence. He quotes Professor James, who in his Gifford Lectures on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, said: "As regards the origin of the Greek gods, we need not at present seek an opinion. But the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion something like this: It is as if there were in the human consciousness *a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception* of what we may call '*something there*,' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed." James did not pursue this line of analysis; but that such a keen introspectionist as Professor James should infer from his exhaustive study of religious experience, that there was a perception of something there, the feeling of objectivity to the object of religious experience must add weight to

what Dr. Otto finds in the analysis of his own experience.

Personally I feel that there is much in Dr. Otto's position that explains elements in my own religious experience which the modern psychology of religion fails to explain; it is in perfect harmony with what those who have entered most deeply into the religious life tell us they experience. Dr. Otto argues that in our experience of God there is an element which is non-rational; a something which is left undescribed (it may be undescribable) when we have used all the concepts with which language supplies us. That "overplus of meaning," that something left over, in our attempted description of our experience of God, though apparently vague when we attempt to convey it in words, is anything but vague to those who have had some hour when, like Moses, they felt they were standing upon holy ground; or had some moment when the sense of God's presence stole over them and enveloped them like the beautiful twilight of a northern evening.

Indeed, just because it is the deepest element in the truly religious experience, it cannot be expressed except in metaphors, and analogies which can but suggest what we experience, but never wholly describe it. The poets and mystics probably come nearest to a description of what is felt. Wordsworth's "A Presence that disturbs me with a sense of joy" is a good example; but all the great poets witness to Dr. Otto's contention that there is within us a "numinous disposition" whereby we become directly aware of an objective presence, a something there that stirs emotion wholly different from what we experience in any other relation of human contacts.

It is too soon yet to be dogmatic on the matter; and even if Dr. Otto's theory could be proved to the hilt, the "numinous disposition" would have to be described in terms different from that by which an instinct is defined. Though we may experience God, in virtue of an innate disposition, there are elements in the instinctive interests which have no counterpart in the "numinous disposition." Our instincts are dynamic; the conditions of their excitement are fairly well known; as a rule they involve definite kinds of reaction. It would be saying too much if we urged that man has a disposition actively to seek God in virtue of an innate specifically religious disposition. The "numinous disposition" does help us to explain the fact that every deeply felt religious experience yields a difference in emotional content that the compounding of various emotions does not seem to wholly account for; and it helps us to understand a great deal else in our religious experience which we need not discuss here; it would relieve the psychologist of religion from having to account for the spiritual life by non-spiritual elements. Personally, I feel that man's unceasing quest for God has its innate basis in his instinctive nature as a whole, and his urge to completeness; certainly, as Professor Paterson argues in his recent Gifford Lectures, there are instincts in man that religion satisfies to the utmost—satisfies as no other experience can satisfy; and that basis is as far as the psychologist can go with logical certainty with his present knowledge.

One great advantage the psychology of religion has brought to us; it has exploded once for all the idea that religion had its origin in the lower fears of man,

and that it could be explained by elements which we ought to have outgrown—magic, witchcraft, priest-craft, fear of hell-fire, etc. Magic is an attempt to coerce the gods; religion is man's method of coming into relationship with God through communion and fellowship. Religion created the priest; religious needs were antecedent to priestly orders. Fear of hell-fire never made a man religious, though it may have helped him to restrain tendencies to evil; and the fact that religion lives on when the idea of hell-fire has little hold on religious communities is enough to disprove the contention that it either originated or sustains the religious interest.

CHAPTER V

ACQUIRED INTERESTS AS THE TEACHER'S ALLIES

NOTHING is more characteristic of the young child than his impatience. His desires cannot wait ; they demand immediate satisfaction. And this is not to be wondered at, for, psychologically, he is at the instinctive level of development and mentally at the perceptive. At this stage what will give him immediate satisfaction or what appeals to his senses determines his behaviour. He has little power of sustained attention, and is moved entirely by instinctive interests or perceptions that arouse those interests.

Stages in Development

Gradually, however, ideas begin to play their part in his behaviour. Whereas he was moved previously to activity by sensations or the arousal of instinctive interests, these may now lead to thought as well as activity. This is the ideational stage mentally, and the sentiment stage psychologically.

That this is one of the most important stages of character formation can be easily grasped. His emotions with their corresponding activities are being organised round definite ideas or objects. He is acquiring interest in many things. His sentiments

will exert a controlling influence on his instinctive tendencies, and his acquired interests will give him the opportunity for activities in which the self is being expressed.

When a child comes to love his mother, a controlling tendency begins to permeate his instinctive interests and consequently his desires. His behaviour becomes modified. He will seek his mother not for what she gives him, but just for the joy of being with her; he will have a tendency to repine if she is long absent; he will control the impatience of his desires in order to please her or win her approbation; he will "make a noise quietly" rather than increase her headache. But the sentiment for his mother is not merely a negative tendency. He may come to form some conscious purpose in relation to her, and that conscious purpose will determine, for the time being, his activities and desires. A simple illustration like this of the mother-sentiment gives us some idea of the power of sentiments in character formation; and there is no limit to the sentiments we may form.

Likewise the acquired interests have their influence, though not so strong. They are very important, however, as they often are the starting-points of later-formed abstract sentiments, such as the love of truth, the love of justice, etc. A boy acquires an interest in his Sunday school, and later this may develop into a love of the Church for its own sake. But all his interests are occupying his mind, giving outlet to his emotions, directing his activities and shaping his character. That is why it is so much more important to give a boy a many-sided interest in the Bible, in

the Church, in missions, than a many-sided knowledge about them. An interest remains while the mere knowledge may have little or no influence on his thoughts or behaviour. Nevertheless, it must not be thought that there is any antagonism between knowledge and interest; on the contrary, the interest may come through acquiring the knowledge, and with the increase of knowledge the interest becomes deeper. What should be remembered is, that *it is the interest we have to help him to acquire* and not merely the knowledge.

Rational Stage of Development

Later we reach the rational stage of mental development. The youth may now be guided not merely by sentiments and interests which are rooted in emotional systems. He comes to be influenced by rational principles. When a growing mind realises the rationality of loving one's parents, the sentiment becomes reinforced; it is not outgrown. Similarly with the religious sentiment which may be formed before the rational stage of development is reached; it finds a rational basis; it ceases to be merely rooted in feeling. But at the rational stage the youth may, in seeking a rational basis for his sentiments, become critical of many of the ideas that have become attached to the object of his sentiment. The sentiments for the Church, for his country, for God, may remain firmly rooted in his mind, but his ideas concerning them may undergo vast changes. He still loves the Church, but may not now identify it with his particular denomination; he may still love his country with-

out now thinking that other nations are on a lower level of culture; his love to God is still as powerful in his life, yet his whole conception of God may change. We may be sure that the more rational justification we can find for our sentiments the stronger will be the feeling we experience toward them; and the greater will be their influence on our conduct.

With the coming of the rational stage of development, our acquired interests will also suffer modification. Some may be dropped as inconsistent with the larger ends or purposes which now begin to dominate us; some may become starting-points of abstract sentiments. For example, our interest in politics may lead to a passionate love of a democratic form of government, or a conservative, etc.; our interest in fair play may develop into a love of Justice as such. Probably the finest type of religion is that which sees God not merely as the loving Father, but as the very *reason* of things, the meaning of the universe; there is such a thing as loving God with the mind as well as the heart, and this is only possible at the rational stage of development.

Enough has now been said to give us some idea of how the various interests are fundamental to the transmuting of the instinctive self into a moral and spiritual self; and the interests that are characteristic of the three levels of development. But all these interests from the instinctive to the rational interest are the allies of the teacher. Not one of these interests need be the enemy of her or his work in the classroom or to the teacher's aim to help the child to acquire sentiments and interests that will influence him towards

the Christian ideal and the Christian life. Interests are the channels of God's Grace; they are the medium in which the Holy Spirit works. Without our interests God could never work through us, nor for that matter upon us; and as we have seen, the whole object of education from the psychological point of view is the creation of acquired interests and sentiments.

Emotion and Behaviour

There is another aspect of the sentiments which is exceedingly important for the study of religious education. We are all familiar with the fact that our behaviour, if not prompted by emotion, is always accompanied with emotion. Behaviour is prompted by interest, and, as we have seen, interest has always a subjective side, an emotional side which we contrasted with the dynamic and objective sides. Our primary instinctive interests always involve emotion—curiosity involves wonder, danger involves fear, self-abasement involves negative self-feeling, etc. The function of feeling seems to be to reinforce activity, or to sustain it. Hence the arousal of emotion is important for those whose work it is to form religious character.

Our sentiments, as we have seen, are just systems of emotions with their corresponding impulses organised round some object or idea of an object. There are emotions which can be experienced only in virtue of having sentiments. Joy, for example, is experienced when one or other of our stronger sentiments is unimpeded in its operation. A mother feels joy in her

growing child; a teacher has joy in her work; the Apostle speaks of "joy and peace in believing." Joy is not a simple emotion like fear or wonder; nor must it be confused with pleasure. A mother's joy in her child is very complex because her tender emotion, her pride in the child's beauty, positive self-feeling arising out of the fact that the child is hers, are all intermingled; our joy in God will be even more complex still. The difference between pleasure and joy lies in the fact that pleasure pertains to the satisfaction of an instinctive interest and is more or less transitory; joy may be a permanent state of the mind, though not always the dominant conscious feeling.

But joy is only one of the emotions which imply sentiments. We can only reproach some one if we love them or have a strong interest in their welfare; we can only reproach ourselves in so far as we have a strong self-regarding sentiment. Jealousy is another emotion worth mentioning here. We may be jealous for the Church, and our behaviour influenced in such a way that we are inhibited from doing anything that would bring dishonour upon it; or the same emotion may make us active in removing any blemish from its work or message. Every emotion has its own particular kind of behaviour which it reinforces; and the sentiment itself becomes strengthened by the behaviour it excites, both on its impulsive and feeling sides. The sentiment tends to utilise everything that will further its ends; and at the same time it tends to inhibit everything that would hinder its aims. "Love God and do what you like," said Augustine. The strong God-sentiment will inhibit the tendency to do

anything contrary to what we believe to be God's will.

Interests and Character

Apart altogether from the bearing of acquired interests and sentiments on religious education, it is not difficult to realise their importance for character as a whole. They are the sources of all behaviour that can be classed as higher in contrast with purely instinctive behaviour. Voluntary conduct in the true sense of the term begins with the formation of the sentiments. They give direction to the will; and will is impossible without them, though it involves much more. Character is not just the sum of our sentiments and acquired interests. Rather our character is our sentiments and interests with what degree of synthesis or unification they have attained. Our character, in other words, will depend, not merely on the sentiments we have acquired, but also on the sentiment that becomes dominant. Sentiments, like our instincts, may clash; and where there is no strong ruling sentiment we are apt to have a good deal of indecision. It is not enough to work for the increase of good sentiments, but we must ever keep in mind the primary need for order and unity in the growing number of sentiments. Be that as it may, it cannot be too strongly urged that psychological development on which character, personality, joy, and happiness depend, can only be acquired through the acquisition of sentiments that imply strong and enduring interests.

We have now, as far as space will admit, outlined the interests, innate and acquired, through which the teacher has to work if the religious development of the

child is to become complete. The task of the religious teacher will be to " adjust these interests to the idea of God," so that the idea of God becomes the controlling sentiment in the growing life of the child, the central interest in the mind of the adolescent, and the source of his deepest joy in the grown man. Such a controlling sentiment will determine moral behaviour at every point ; in so far as the idea of God is broad based, and His will broadly conceived, the self will be stably organised, and repression of legitimate desires will be reduced to a minimum. Each interest, be it instinctive or acquired, will play its legitimate part, and receive its legitimate satisfactions ; there will be full opportunity for self-expression, but it will be a self-expression in harmony with the moral and spiritual consciousness, and thus involving no division of the self.

Perhaps the best illustration of the control exerted by a ruling sentiment in harmony with the moral and spiritual consciousness is that of the managing director of some huge store. There he is somewhere in the building with probably a thousand employees scattered in the various departments. His purpose is to see that every one is subserving the success of the business. He represses none ; from the doorkeeper and the lift-boy to the designers and chiefs of departments, all are swept into the purpose of the business ; he takes the particular ability of each and directs it into the channel where it finds its best expression, and thus brings the greatest joy and success to its owner, as well as the greatest advantage to the manager's purpose. So with controlling sentiment ; it represses nothing ; it sweeps the energy of each system into its purpose of develop-

ing the whole man ; the whole man is being developed, not at the expense of his instinctive or acquired interests, but through them. The more comprehensive the sentiment, the more developed the man, and the more satisfaction to each particular interest.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION AND THE HOME

"ADOLESCENCE," says Dr. M'Curdy, "is the period during which people of either sex are apt to become keenly aware of their sexual and other problems. For this reason most patients date their "nervousness" from this time; but any one who goes beneath the surface of such phenomena sees that adolescence is merely the time when the faulty preparation for life becomes dramatically evident, the causative factors lying far behind."

Dr. M'Curdy is here thinking of neurotic patients suffering from one or other of the functional nervous disorders such as Hysteria, Phobia, or Obsession. But his dictum applies equally to those who have failed to win a moral or spiritual life. All neurotic trouble has its roots in some failure of psychological development, some failure to become adjusted to the realities of life, and in the great majority of cases goes back to early childhood. Adolescence is the time for moral and religious decisions; it is not the seed-time; it is the period when whatever has rooted itself in the mind of the child begins to manifest itself in consciousness.

Adolescence not "the" Important Period

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that important as adolescence is, it is not *the* important period in character formation. Recent study has shown that the formative years begin at the beginning; and the study of the delinquent and unstable child, as well as the analysis of the abnormal adult, gives conclusive evidence that the earliest years are vital for the formation of those attitudes which determine the moral and religious outlook both of the adolescent and the adult.

All this is quite easily understood when one remembers that the instincts and emotional dispositions of the child are first in the field. Long before the child can rationally or morally judge an action the instinctive interests are finding outlet almost unimpeded at first. This brings pleasure and, naturally, the desire to repeat the experiences. Habits are acquired at this time and tendencies indulged which to a child have no moral content; but in later years these habits and tendencies may come under the ban of conscience or society; and yet the growing youth may not be able to break away from them.

But it is not merely in the matter of what one might call bodily habits that the early infancy and childhood are important; but also in the habit of mind or outlook that is then acquired. A man's attitude to society, for example, is very largely the attitude he had as a child to the first society he enters—the home. His attitude to religion is undoubtedly acquired there. The early environment of the infant and young child is predominantly mental, and it is this mental environ-

ment which is determining whether he shall be able to adjust himself to the realities of life. As Dr. Sloan Chesser has put it : " In many cases the environment in early life damages a person so severely that he becomes a ' half man,' misunderstood, depressed, an unhappy being, cursed with a sense of personal inferiority, unable to adjust himself to life and infinity." And that is not putting it too strongly ; indeed, one ought to say " in most cases " ; for no one who knows the literature dealing with the maladjusted and the neurotic, or has the experience of trying to help these, but feels the tremendous responsibility that lies on parents, nurses, and teachers.

How many a teacher by humiliating a child in school has sent that child into the world not merely with a sense of personal inferiority, but that far worse mental attitude—a fear of being thought inferior ? Many a man who has attained high position in the commercial or intellectual world still carries this fear of being thought inferior, and never gains the confidence in himself that would make him the power for good his ability implies. How many a mother, with thoughtless expressions of her love, or an overcareful shielding of her boy from the harsher realities of life, fixates him on herself, with the result that he is never afterwards able to face the responsibilities of marriage, of manhood, or life itself ? Such a one, if he does marry, will marry a mother-substitute ; he will seek the " cushy job " ; and just because of his unconscious refusal of responsibility his latent powers never become developed.

Motherhood and Mothercraft

Now it is not easy to say these things, simply because they imply an indictment of motherhood. We all owe so much to our mothers, and when we become older we can so realise the sacrifices they made for us that it seems ungrateful to trace our failures to them. But in reality it is not so much an indictment of motherhood as it is an indictment of mothercraft. We are so apt to think that where there is love there is everything, and a mother gives love as neither father nor wife nor children can give, that we forget that love is quite compatible with real ignorance as to what is the good of the child. Love can only sustain our activity for the good of the child; it cannot tell us what that good is. Our love ought to lay upon our hearts the solemn responsibility of finding out what is the good of the child.

But the very fact that the unstable child, the neurotic adolescent, and the psychologically undeveloped man come from the homes in which love is most demonstrative, and where the physical environment is good, ought to make us stop and think, not whether we love too much, but whether we have put effort into realising the responsibilities of love. These are very true words in the introduction to the volume on *Health and Psychology of the Child,* edited by Dr. Sloan Chesser: "From lack of knowledge, parents and teachers hurt and harm, spoil and make unhappy, the children with whom they are in touch. Ignorance of psychology is more dangerous than ignorance of general hygiene and physical health. If we have not studied psychology we are too apt to treat all children

alike, but every human mind requires special consideration, special training. The shy, retiring, fearful introvert will suffer intensely from the sort of 'discipline' which is the proper treatment for the bold, self-assured, cheerful extrovert."

Influence of Parents

Psychological development, then, begins at the beginning; and it is the development of the soul rather than the intellect that determines the adjustments to life out of which come the strong character, the stable personality, the capacity for joy and profound happiness. The first five years, in which the child comes into contact mostly with the home influences of which the mother and father are the most important, are vital for character and religion. To him they are as gods, and that prestige makes him more susceptible to suggestions from them than from any other source.

But the suggestion which is so effective here is not the spoken word alone. One must remember that the child has an almost uncanny power of reading the face and sensing the atmosphere. And this cannot be wondered at; long before he is able to understand words he has been interpreting his parents' wishes, their attitude to him, their pleasure or displeasure by their facial expressions. It is really marvellous how even an infant can discover just how to get what he wants. We have all seen the self-willed child who kicks until he gets it. He knows that he has just to kick long enough and the mother will give in; or the father will say: "Oh, let him have it, and let me have

peace." There are other children who know that if they begin to kick they will get something to kick for, so they don't begin. They have probably found out, however, that they can get what they want by "loving" Mummy!

The manner in which a child attempts to get what he wants will depend entirely on home influences. There are many self-willed children who go into "furies" at home, and yet are among the best behaved at school. They quickly intuit or learn from experience that such tactics are no use in school. The self-willed child is almost invariably the product of weakness and indulgence on the part of the parents. The parent who shows an over-solicitude for the child is courting what is called "negativism"—that is, a tendency to do just the opposite to that which he is told to do. He soon knows the mother "worships" him; and he does not fail to take advantage of this. The young child who refuses food is a good example of this tendency; sometimes it is a refusal to wash; to hurry dressing for school in an older child; but, curiously enough, see the little chap once he is out of sight of his mother and he runs lest he be late!

The importance for religious and moral education of this uncanny power of the child to intuit the psychological atmosphere of his home and parents lies in the fact that unconsciously he is intuiting the kind of behaviour, the kind of ideals, the parents spontaneously approve or disapprove; and it is this that is giving content to his conscience—that is, forming the unconscious moral standards he will feel to be authoritative.

In like manner their spontaneous attitude to religion is what the child is intuiting, or receiving by suggestion.

The tone of the voice in which religious things are mentioned, the expression on the face while these things are being spoken of, are being unconsciously impressed on the growing mind, and are determining his attitude to religion, the Church, and service. We must never forget that whatever direct teaching we give our children it is preceded by these unconscious impressions already indelibly imprinted on their minds.

Religious Function of the Home

It is well just here to remind ourselves what our task is in the home in relation to the child's moral and spiritual growth. It is not to impress upon him particular and rigid ideas of God, etc., nor even what is right and wrong in conduct. Rather it is to give him an interest in God, so that his own innate curiosity will cause wonder about Him ; and, his interest being acquired, his growing intelligence, excited by his curiosity and wonder, will keep his mind active and easily aroused into conscious interest. It is true we cannot do this without giving him our ideas of God ; but we must be careful that we do not impose our ideas upon his mind in virtue of our authority. He wil accept our ideas without question during the first years of his life, but if his religion is to become real, his own, and not second hand, he must one day come to speak to God as he will feel God has spoken to him.

The same is true in regard to conduct ; it is far, very far, better to get him interested in doing right than to get him to do what we want him to do. We must remember it is not a theological creed we want

him to accept, but an attitude we desire him to acquire, a sentiment we wish to see influencing his life by organising his emotional dispositions round it. Let him see that God is real to us, rather than that any particular idea of God is true.

That involves the necessity of the child seeing us expressing our own faith in definite religious acts. I doubt if there is any lasting influence left by teaching alone. Bare teaching does not necessarily arouse emotion ; certainly it cannot do so to the same extent as the imitation of the expressive religious acts.

It is probably here that we find the secret of the failure of Sunday schools to-day to grip and hold the young. In spite of the finer organisation of our schools, the grading of departments, teachers' training classes, etc., it is doubtful whether we are receiving as large a proportion of the scholars into the Church as might reasonably be expected. This is not the fault of the school. The failure must be traced to the home, where there is little or no family prayer, grace at meals, and the other expressive acts of our fathers. As Professor Pratt has truly said : " The pyschology of religion might have a good deal to say in favour of the resumption of the old customs of family prayers, the saying of grace at meal-time, and other modes of religious expressions which our fathers practised and which so many have outgrown." Personally, I cannot think of any greater loss to the growing generation than the opportunity of imitating their parents at the solemn acts of worship in the home. They have little or no chance to experience these warm rich emotions which characterise the truly religious life. Apart from the actual imitation, there is not

the same chance to excite the curiosity of the child from seeing how real religion is to father and mother.

An apt illustration of this aspect is found in the autobiography of John G. Paton, the missionary to the New Hebrides. Describing his home, he speaks of the "closet," between the "but" and the "ben," which was "the Sanctuary of the cottage home. Thither daily, and oftentimes a day, generally after each meal, we saw our father retire, and 'shut to the door'; and we children got to understand by a sort of spiritual instinct (for the thing was too sacred to be talked about) that prayers were being poured out there for us, as of old by the High Priest within the veil in the Most Holy Place. We occasionally heard the pathetic echoes of a trembling voice pleading as if for life, and we learned to slip out and in past that door on tiptoe not to disturb the holy colloquy. The outside world might not know, but we knew, whence came that happy light as of a newborn smile that always was dawning on my father's face; it was the reflection from the Divine Presence, in the consciousness of which he lived. Never, in temple or cathedral, on mountain or in glen, can I hope to feel that the Lord is more near, more visibly walking and talking with men, than under that humble cottage roof of thatch and oaken wattles. Though everything else in religion were by some unthinkable catastrophe to be swept out of memory, or blotted from my understanding, my soul would wander back to those early years and shut itself up once again in that Sanctuary Closet, and hearing still the echoes of those cries to God, would hurl back all doubt with the victorious appeal, 'He walked with God, why may not I?'"

There you have a perfect example of what Professor Pratt contends for. You have the arousal of the feeling of reverence through the child's suggestibility ; you have the curiosity and the wonder excited ; you have the rooting of the religious interest which finally becomes a sentiment with its memory of emotions which gave dynamic force to the faith of this man.

Influence of Example

But it is not merely from the overt acts of faith that the child receives his first and deepest impressions of religion. The child is far more intelligent than sometimes we give him credit for. He is a splendid logician, as some of us know to our cost. Unconsciously the child draws inferences for religion from the attitude we manifest in our troubles, sorrows, and anxieties. Sorrow bravely borne, trouble faced with Christian courage, the glad answer to the call of some stern duty as though it were a privilege, the sacrifice of immediate satisfactions for the sake of ideals, the manifest acceptance of responsibility towards the less fortunate in the community—in a word, the exercise spontaneously of the Christian virtues—these are all forming the background of a child's consciousness, and determining how he shall meet the harsher experiences of life ; and what is even more important, the attitude of his parents in these things becomes the vague hinterland from which come his ideas of God, the very meaning of the religious life, and his attitude to faith itself. These things, which seem so slight in themselves, determine the direction of the religious interest, whether towards religion or away from it.

Mal-Associations

Another thing we have to keep in mind in regard to home influence is the fact of Association of Ideas. For years I myself had the irrational idea that to experience any great joy was to tempt God to some reprisal. The whole thing was vividly brought back some time ago when playing golf with a friend. He was playing badly, and he said that his play must have been a punishment for some wrong he had done ! I analysed my own tendency, and traced it to a very enjoyable day as a child with my mother. In the midst of our uproarious laughter, my mother suddenly stopped, and, with a serious look on her face, said : "I wonder what we shall suffer for all this fun !" For years I could never enjoy myself without a similar feeling underlying the experience. I knew perfectly well that the feeling was irrational, but did not get rid of it ; I had to break the mal-association before I realised freedom from the obsession.

There can be no doubt at all that most of our irrational ideas of God in relation to punishment and His relation to us are due to such wrong associations. Religion is too apt to be associated with funerals, and punishment instead of the toys and pleasures of the healthy child. A wise mother will associate all her child's joys with God ; she will connect the pleasure with His goodness ; her own forgiveness of any fault with His grace. She will be very chary of giving her child the idea that God is a sort of policeman ready to run us to justice. We have to remember that the young child has little or no critical consciousness, and takes as authoritative any association we may make.

In a similar way we are apt to make goodness unattractive. We associate it with restraints, or with all sorts of false ideas. The good child is thought to be the child who is obedient to our every wish and whim, whereas he is just repressed. It is this that gives point to what A. S. Neil says in his book on *The Problem Child*, that a child never goes wrong except through teaching him to be good. He thinks that we ought not to teach a child to be good, for that is the quickest way to give him a false sense of guilt, and thus to repressions, which later come out in abnormalities of behaviour. There is a world of truth in this position. We cannot teach a child to be good ; he must learn to be good. Teach a child to be happy, says Neil ; and parents would do well to take to heart the observation of one who has attempted so much for the "problem child."

But what about goodness ? the parent is apt to ask. Very quickly the child comes to learn that he cannot be happy outside of goodness. I do not believe that a child is first bad and then unhappy ; he is first unhappy and then bad. A happy child is not likely to do wrong. Indeed, we must remember that there is no such thing as a bad child. If a child does wrong it is more likely to be because he does not know any better or else the tendency has become compulsive.

So far, I have had in mind the young child—the child up to five or six years of age. Up to between three and a half to four years of age the child is driven by his instinctive tendencies ; his desires during that period relate to instinctive satisfactions, and indirect teaching alone is to be followed here. Once self-con-

sciousness is reached, sentiments begin to play their part, more permanent interests begin to be formed, and these will form a new medium of the religious knowledge we desire to transmit and the primary source of control and guidance to the instinctive tendencies.

Later Formative Periods

The period up to eight years of age is the seed-time ; adolescence is the period when the youth becomes vividly aware of his habits and the fruits that have grown from the seeds of earlier years. Up to eight years the boy and girl have been growing rapidly both physically and mentally, though not necessarily psychologically. From twelve to eighteen we have another period of rapid growth ; but between eight and twelve there is a definite pause in growth, and a tendency towards general stability. " Mental as well as physical characteristics are so well adjusted as to appear permanent. The normal boy or girl during this period is thoroughly healthy, exceedingly active, and well-controlled. The rapid increase afterwards is something that would hardly be expected." We are all familiar with the fact of seeing a girl or boy growing up " all at once," as we say. But what is happening during the pause ? What is the real function of this apparent pause ?

Adjustments to Reality

It is during this pause that the seeds are rooting. Before this period the child has been growing so quickly, and his interests multiplying so rapidly and his environment extending so widely, that there has been no time

for the seeds to take root. The soil has been thin; there has been a widening of interest but no corresponding increase of depth.

With the advent of boyhood and girlhood, there comes the opportunity for deepening the soil, so that the interests we have helped to sow may become permanent. It is *now* there begins the transmutation of the instinctive self into a moral self; it is now that the three great Adjustments to Society, Sex, and God can be made with least conflict. The adjustment to society means that the child must pass from the individualistic stage and acquire the corporate mind. In other words, he must acquire the team spirit, the spirit of co-operation in common ends and purposes. Here is an illustration. A boy of my acquaintance, nine years of age, used to come home at the beginning of the summer with the tale of the runs he had made, and the wickets he had taken in school cricket. If I asked him which team had won, or what score his side had made, his answer was vague. This showed me that he was interested only in his own performance. It can be seen at once that it is only as a boy becomes more interested in the team's success than his own that he will be fit to play in a team. In the same way, a boy should learn to work for the success of his Form rather than from the morbid desire to be at the top; he will be a team-man in group play, etc. When he reaches manhood the Kingdom of God will then have a chance of becoming a fundamental motivating power in all his actions. Society will cease to be a restraining force; it will then constrain him. It will thus become "the means of his moral life." He will be adjusted to society.

Again at this age begins the adjustment to that fundamental fact of our nature, sex. I am convinced from clinical study of aberrations, and observations of normal boys and girls, that this is the age when the adjustment can be made with least conflict. Long before this the child's curiosity has been busy on the matter, but it is now that girls and boys begin to talk of such things to one another. Failure here has far-reaching effects on the growing life, and leaves marks not easily erased.

Finally, there comes the adjustment to God. Long before this period the child has been unconsciously taking up his attitude to God and the world. This attitude is emotional in the first instance, however true it is that later we may seek a rational basis for the attitude we finally take.

Development of the Junior Child

Let us try to visualise what is taking place. From the physical side a much finer co-ordination is being formed between the brain and the body. In other words, the nervous system is getting down to its work. Watch the boy of eight at games ; he mistimes his hit, misjudges the flight of the ball, etc. ; but watch him at eleven or twelve, and you will find the co-ordination between brain and body, nerves and muscles, finely adjusted. One is astonished by the speed and accuracy with which the muscles respond to the nerve stimuli. It is this co-ordination that makes him enjoy the game ; and it is the degree of co-ordination that determines his skill. He is unconsciously making his nervous system his ally.

Something analogous to this takes place psychologically. If his psychological development is normal, then he will *want to do* the things that he feels he *ought to do*. In other words, his instinctive interests will be co-ordinating themselves with the more permanent interests of his sentiments. His instincts will be controlled by the great realities of society, sex, and God. Ideas are leading to action as well as sensations ; and the sensations themselves are leading to thought. He is gaining freedom from isolated impulses ; an inner freedom of controlling himself from within. His instincts, desires, etc., are becoming integrated with larger ends and purposes. He is becoming capable of joy as well as pleasure. The problem child is just the child whose instincts have never become co-ordinated with sentiments.

From this we can infer the kind of lessons that ought to be given. Up to this time the boy has been learning at a rapid rate—too rapidly for his knowledge to become co-ordinated. Now he stops a little. He wants to know the cause of things ; and, when he knows that, he pushes on to ask the purpose of things. Direct teaching now begins to play its part. It is true that religion is caught ; but it must never be forgotten that all religion comes to rest on some basis of belief, and that this can be taught. When the child becomes interested in causes he does not stop until he asks, " Who made God ? " Theology, as has been well said, is a child's first science. At this stage his suggestibility is likely to make him accept our answers ; but not necessarily. He may doubt our statements if they contradict his experience or something that the day-school teacher has said.

It is this interest in causes and purposes that makes the junior child so deeply interested in history. Mary Sheldon Barnes of America, who made a thorough study of the historic sense in children of this age, says: "From the age of seven onwards we find them inquiring after time, cause, and effect, the social unit and the truthful record—that is, all the elements of history lie within the field of the child's curiosity." This interest in cause and effect in the field of history can be carried over to the moral world, and may help him to realise cause and effect in the life of character.

By using this native interest we can begin religious instruction with the Old Testament histories, judiciously chosen until he comes to see something of God's working on the plane of this world. Is it not here, too, that we ought to introduce the idea of God's coming into history in the Person of our Lord? Here the Why? and the Wherefore? ought to be encouraged. If we are wise we shall let him make his own applications, only guiding his thought according to his questions, but never imposing our own ideas. We must remember that at this age doubts are not uncommon, especially with regard to immortality and prayer.

The child's moral problem really begins during this period. There is no greater fallacy than to think that boys and girls from eight to twelve know nothing of evil. At this age they probably do more wrong knowingly than at any other period of their life. Every psycho-analyst knows that little evils indulged in knowingly at this period may become habits difficult to break, or may even become compulsive in later years.

We may quote from Professor Jones' *A Boy's Religion from Memory* : " Children from eight to fourteen are by no means so innocent as we like to think them. Many of them consciously break more moral laws than they ever will in mature life." On the other hand, we must guard against repression of conscience as well as of instinctive desires. An unresolved inner conflict at this period may lead to failure of adjustment, with its consequent neurosis later on. A child passes through a great deal of conflict at this period ; much more than appears on the surface. And it is the conflict between the instinctive desires and more ideal interests that creates the need for discipline. The young tree needs turning to the sun. Love and strictness, discipline and freedom, are not antitheses. Discipline is needed if freedom from inward restraints due to the domination of isolated impulses is to be gained; the boy needs freedom to act along the line of his ideal. But it must be an informed discipline, informed by a knowledge of the good of the child. As Pfister puts it : " Genuine strictness is free from arbitrariness ; it does not want to play the master for the pleasure of showing its power ; it commands and forbids only that which, after mature consideration, it considers good and therefore possible of accomplishment ; but having come to a decision it insists on fulfilment."

The Adolescent

In turning to adolescence, I cannot but remind you of the quotation with which this chapter commenced. Adolescence is the harvest-time of all that has rooted in the earlier years. Nevertheless, there are well-defined

characteristics of this period that make it very important for the reaping of the harvest in the interests both of moral and religious education. It is the age of idealism, the age of decision, the age of hopes, of awaking love. The years before will have determined the kind of ideals that are likely to appeal, the objects on which decisions will be taken, the kind of hopes that will diffuse the mind, and what the awaking love promises to give. Just because this period has these characteristics the possibility of correction of earlier aberrations is at its maximum.

Moral and Spiritual Conflict

It is these finer characteristics that create the moral conflict so common at this period. Conflict is only possible when idealism is present. The growing mind is faced with a dualism within ; sex consciousness is accompanied by sexual feelings which not seldom lead to sexual temptations. Isolated impulses, desires, ambitions with their promise of immediate satisfactions, come into conflict with the moral urge to perfection and the strong urge of conscience. Quite spontaneously the adolescent thinks in terms of what ought to be. That is why he is such a hard critic of social conditions and of those who stand for the ideal. He is judging the minister not by what he says, but by the measure in which the minister lives up to the ideal. At this stage he has no doubts about the possibility of the ideal. His innate idealism makes it impossible for him to camouflage his conscience with the thought that it is impossible to attain the ideal. Evil is never so real in after life, nor for that matter is good. He

not only believes in ideals but in idealism—that is, that the ideal is implicit in things. That the ideal is possible amid the actual is for him an immediate inference.

What makes this period with its idealism so decisive is the fact that the idea of the Self becomes clearer in consciousness. The human being is a rational and moral being ; but these abstract ideas do not play a large part till now. Habits, desires, etc., have been formed in the preceding years ; but at this period the growing mind realises vividly that these are " Mine," " Me." There comes a more objective view of the self. Self-consciousness dawns somewhere between three and four years of age ; but now the adolescent is morally and spiritually self-conscious. Hence the self comes up for judgment.

It is this that makes the moral conflict so intense. Though the Self-regarding sentiment and indeed other sentiments have been functioning for years, it is now that it may become the conscious integrating factor in character and personality. The ideal self which can now be objectively seen comes into conscious conflict with the actual self ; and the adolescent may try to break away from tendencies and desires which he finds occupying the conscious field. He experiences ideas, desires, feelings, and actions as " Mine," and he has to settle with his conscience whether they are worthy of him.

Again, the ideas of God, of Christ, of the Church ; his attitudes, social and individual, are now brought spontaneously to the bar of rational judgment. They must receive rational sanction else there is no inner peace, no conscious unity ; there is a " divided self."

It is difficult to overestimate this vivid awareness of the moral and rational self for religious education. What the moral self ought to be will depend very largely on previous training ; the power to evaluate rationally that self will be determined to some extent by the education received. Yet not wholly. In virtue of his individuality, the adolescent will have his own point of view, and may demand a greater moral self than the prevailing moral standards ; he may seek a more rational conception of the fundamental religious realities than his fathers. For this reason the " authority " of elders must give way to the innate demand for freedom. When the teacher has tried to instil high moral content to conscience, and unfolded the conception of God in Christ, he must stand aside, as it were, that the decision of the adolescent may be his own. There is no danger like a second-hand religion.

The Part played by Decision

As was said in a previous section, the unification of character and personality comes through one of the sentiments gaining predominance. The older evangelicals were psychologically right when they spoke of making Christ King. The function of religious education, as we have seen, is to make the religious sentiment the ruling sentiment. There can be no strong, stable self or personality without a dominating sentiment ; and the kind of sentiment that ascends the throne will determine the kind of personality achieved.

It is these facts that have determined adolescence as the period of moral and spiritual decisions. Few,

if any, would question Professor Starbuck's conclusion : " Conversion is an adolescent phenomenon." We can see why. It is at adolescence that affective, moral, and rational needs cry out for gratification. The soul demands a universe friendly to its needs, its hopes, etc. In so far as religion is presented as the goal and satisfaction of these needs, the adolescent will decide for religion. How hard it will be to make the decision will depend almost entirely on the training up to this period ; and the impressions received in childhood, now unconscious, will be determining factors.

Decision, then, is the most fundamental need of this time. Just as adolescence is the time for decision on vocation and concentration on preparation if worldly success is to be attained, so it is the period when spiritual decision must be made if the function of religious education is to be fulfilled, and the instinctive self transmuted into a spiritual self.

CHAPTER VII

HOW RELIGIOUS IDEAS ARE ACQUIRED AND JUSTIFIED

IN the preceding chapters we have been concerned mainly with the processes whereby the religious attitude is taken and the religious sentiment acquired; we must now inquire how we come to get definite beliefs about God, sin, atonement, salvation, etc. It is no part of the psychologist's task to justify the particular beliefs which an individual or Church holds; he has done his work when he has accounted for the fact that we come to believe at all, and how we come to particular beliefs. As we have already said, the religious attitude is not identical with beliefs; but the religious sentiment can never be a controlling power apart from beliefs. It is only when we can consciously justify our beliefs, at least to ourselves, that the religious sentiment begins to function in the true sense of the term. That the mother believes in God will be sufficient rational justification to a child; but some kind of justified idea is necessary, I think, before the bare religious attitude becomes the religious sentiment proper.

The Religious Sentiment

In the first chapter we saw that the function of religious education is to help the growing child to

make the religious sentiment the authoritative and controlling element in life. Now the sentiment is not mere feeling, though it is a feeling or emotional disposition. By definition a sentiment is a system of emotional-conative dispositions organised about an object or idea of an object. A love sentiment, *e.g.*, is not a disposition to experience only pleasantly toned emotion regarding an object ; the idea of the object will determine the kind of emotion experienced. If the object of our love is absent we shall feel sorrow ; if in danger, anxiety ; if insulted, we shall feel resentment and anger. This is one of the essential differences between an instinct and a sentiment. An instinctive interest, when aroused, is characterised in consciousness by a specific emotion which is always of the same quality ; but a whole range of different emotions may be experienced in virtue of a sentiment. Looked at from the point of view of the emotions, the religious sentiment is the most complex that we can experience ; and many of the characteristic religious emotions are themselves very complex. Reverence, *e.g.*, is a compound of awe, admiration, and the tender-emotion ; and awe and admiration are themselves compounded of fear, negative-self feeling, and wonder. If we think of the feelings of repentance, forgiveness, and peace that come to soul from faith in God's providence, etc., we can form an idea of the complexity of the religious sentiment on the feeling side, and the extraordinary range of emotions organised within it. There can be no doubt that the range and complexity of the emotions here are due to the ideas connected with the object of the sentiment—God. The ideas are

determinative for the kind of emotion experienced at any particular moment.

Influence of Ideas

Hence, not the least important element in religious education will be to help the child to acquire an ideational content to his growing sentiment. We must ever keep in mind the important part sentiments play in character and conduct. They are determinative. Our ideas of God determine not merely the quality of the emotions we shall experience, but the kind of behaviour the sentiment will inspire. It is probable that the very first experience of religious emotion will be accompanied by some kind of an idea, however vague; and certainly it is true that the growing sentiment of the child, youth, and adolescent is modified, widened, and strengthened, as the larger conceptions of God and His relation to us are acquired. It is the conception of God that determines the emotional experience in regard to Him and His Kingdom, and also the religious behaviour.

It is in place here, then, to study the various ways by which we acquire our ideas of God, and to see how far we can control the approaches to God; but it is even more important that we understand how the growing mind comes to justify the beliefs.

The child is already religious before he comes to us with his questions and for direct teaching. It might be more accurate to say that he is already interested; but that interest has arisen out of experienced emotion, so that it is no exaggeration to say he is religious.

And as we have seen, he has already ideas. It would be difficult for the child of four onwards to be without ideas, however little direct or indirect teaching we may have given. Not a few of his ideas of God he will get from his brothers and sisters, his little friends incidentally. It may be that by four the maid has given more than we can get rid of!

Very largely, then, the child acquires his beliefs regarding God quite uncritically from his environment, inasmuch as the child cannot conceptually transcend his experience; his conceptions will be anthropomorphic—that is, he will conceive of God in terms of human personality. In the main, these early views will conform to the traditionally accepted views of the group to which he belongs. If it would be going too far to say that the child believes what he is told to believe, it would be near the truth to say that he believes what he understands others to believe. The quaintness with which a child expresses his beliefs in God is not due to the fact that he differs in these beliefs from those in his immediate environment, but to the meagreness of his vocabulary, and also to the fact that he thinks in pictures and is dependent for his expressions on the picture material in his mind. As his experience of life is as yet small, his attempts at formulating ideas of God are crude and sometimes amusing.

The difficulty is not in accounting for his beliefs, but for the justification of these which he makes as he grows older. Just because it is the ideas that he can justify to himself which will determine the ideational content of his religious sentiment, and hence his behaviour, it is exceedingly important that we under-

stand how his ideas come to be justified. From eight onwards we shall find the child seeking justification for his ideas; and at the adolescent stage, when he ought to be making a decision as to what place religion is to have in his life, it is essential that the teacher should be able to give guidance. The child does not reason himself into his beliefs, in the first place; he comes to realise that he has them. His early beliefs are practically all the outcome of his suggestibility; it is when he finds his growing experience apparently contradicting them, or his greater knowledge clashing with his simpler views, that he begins either to justify the views he has accepted, or to find others more in harmony with his growing knowledge of the world, and his greater grasp of moral ideas.

Danger of Traditional Beliefs

In the first place, he may be content to believe as his mother has taught him to believe, or as his Church has taught him. He may even think it blasphemous to question anything that has come to him through channels connected in his unconscious mind with the emotions he had as a child towards those who taught him, or with whom he had his first experiences of the religious emotions. He will stand, then, for whatever traditional views of the Scriptures, and the various doctrines about God he has received; and though he may not justify what he believes as his teachers did, it will be their ideas he will seek to justify. Indeed, it would not be untrue to say that it was the parent teacher, or Church that he was trying to justify rather than his opinions and beliefs. His religion both from

the emotional and behaviour point of view will be of the traditional type; the content of his religious experience will have a strong tendency to stop growing, though it may remain intense. There will be a tendency to suspect new modes of thought and new modes of religious behaviour.

No doubt all our religious experience is coloured by beliefs that have been accepted on the authority of others, either in childhood or later; but the traditionalist will be apt to over-emphasise not merely the things once delivered to the saints, but *their* interpretation of them. He is apt to forget that it is the interpretation of what was delivered to the saints that gives ideational content to the religious sentiment, and thus the emotional and behaviour content.

The real danger in religious education here is that the traditional element in religious experience and belief will come to be dominant, and that reason and curiosity will be inhibited from exploring the conceptions of God. Thus though the experience may be real it will remain narrow; it may even be thrust into a "logic-tight compartment" to which no critical tendency ever enters. Religion has nothing to fear from investigation. Though the child must learn how the religious experience has come, and how men have explained that experience and God the object of the experience, it would be well from the first to teach him to leave the "windows of his mind and soul" open to what must inevitably be a progressive revelation. Revelation is not so much a body of doctrine contained in the Bible, or in the creeds of a Church, as it is an experience. The Bible is not the

Revelation so much as the *record* of the Revelation that God has been making in the experience of men, and in our Lord Jesus Christ.

But already I have written on the dangers of imposing our ideas or traditional ideas upon the child mind. Let us see that we help him to have the experience of God; his own instinctive interest in the reason and explanation will lead him to a justification of his beliefs that at least will be his own. We must help him to avoid if we can what Professor James called a "faith in some one else's faith."

The Demand for Rational Justification

There is a vast number even of children, and certainly of adolescents, who cannot but demand a more rational justification of their faith than the authority of parents, Church, or even the Bible. They do not doubt for a moment the effects of religion in the lives of their godly parents, nor the Church as a Divine institution, nor the Bible as of supreme value for religious life and faith; indeed, that it is a Word of God to the soul. But they have left the stage of primitive credulity, and feel that if their experience is real it can be based and justified by reason. Their forms of reasoning may be as old as the Christian Church, but they are forms of reasoning; and such believers undoubtedly consider that reason is the basis of their faith.

It is not our concern here whether the arguments used to validate faith can be upheld. We must be satisfied to lay bare the arguments which have given an intellectual basis to the religious sentiment and

provided its intellectual content. As Professor Pratt has pointed out, the old arguments for God which it was thought Kant and modern science had killed are still very vital in the faith of many earnest men and women, and because of that are of interest to the educator.

There are three forms of such "rational" justification of belief in God. In the first place, God's existence is derived from the idea of God as a perfect Being; the idea of a perfect Being demands His existence to explain it. The fact that we can conceive a Being with attributes of Perfection, Almighty Power, etc., must be accounted for; and those who use this "Ontological" argument say that it can only be accounted for on the assumption that there is such a Being.

Others again attempt to justify their faith by an appeal to experience, that nothing is ever found without a cause. This is what is known as the "Cosmological" argument. It is the first justification of the child, who, as we have seen, wants to know finally "Who made God?" A First Cause, it is argued, must be assumed; the whole series of events in Nature demand such a cause great enough to account for the stupendous effects that we see in Nature, and which science is ever opening up.

Another argument which is among the first to still the doubts of the young is the "Teleological" argument. A little child is not satisfied with the cause of things; he wants to know the purpose of them. In the philosophical schools this argument, at one time, took a very prominent place; and a thinker of the calibre of John Stuart Mill gave it a high place. The gist

of it is that everything in the natural world and in living beings seems as though it were created to fulfil the purpose we see it fulfilling ; they go beyond themselves and find their meaning in subserving ends beyond themselves. The trees are beautiful in themselves, but they find their true meaning in fulfilling man's ends ; every range of being depends on some other range. There is a web of life, to use the figure of Professor Arthur Thomson. This is an argument that was well known to the Greek philosophers. Everywhere there seems to be design ; hence we must assume a Designer.

A good deal of favour has been given in recent years to what is called *moral and æsthetic arguments.* We all have a sense of " ought." We feel that there is a moral law to be obeyed ; must we not assume, then, a moral Governor ? Dr. Hastings Rashdall made much of this. Similarly, we are conscious of the beautiful in our experience of the world. Does not the presence of the beautiful, which can only be experienced by personalities, give good ground for the existence of a God whose Garment is the Beautiful ?

In addition to Dr. Otto's book, which has already been mentioned, two other books by younger thinkers in the Church attempt to base the religious sentiment in the experience itself. Dr. Eric Waterhouse, in his *Philosophy of Religious Experience,* attempts to show that the vital feature of all religious experience is the belief in the possibility of a relationship between God and man ; and not the least stimulus to human progress, both morally and intellectually, has been the attempt to find that relationship. He says : " Religion is one of those forces by which man has lived ; it indicates

that human experience has spiritual as well as physical needs." If this is so, then a God who can satisfy the spiritual needs is demanded. Dr. Edwards, in his recent Kerr lectures, accepts Dr. Waterhouse's position, but attempts to root the justification of religious sentiment in the fact that our religious experience or our experience of God is as immediately verified in the consciousness of the believer as is our experience of the external world. The postulates of faith are vindicated by habitual commerce with the realities of the spiritual life. It is, he argues, in man's religious quest that all the finer values of life have had their source ; and a quest that has had such great and glorious results for man cannot be founded in an illusion ; God is demanded.

These are some of the ways by which the adolescent and adult have attempted to justify the belief in God that he first received through the suggestibility of his nature. They are not, however, rationalisations merely —that is, attempts to find reasons for what we already believe and have made up our minds to believe. In many cases they are attempts to find a rational ground for beliefs already accepted, and to many they have given that ground. There are others, however, who have come to believe in God, to experience redemption, peace, forgiveness, etc., whose native curiosity and the need of their rational nature were the starting-points of their search by reason "if haply they might find Him."

In these days when there is little expressive religion in the home, the child has little or no chance of experiencing through imitation and emulation the religious emotions. We must then attempt to stir the

natural curiosity of the growing mind, and also to kindle the rational need for explanation and understanding of the world and our place in it. For that purpose the above attempted justifications for religious beliefs may be looked at from the point of view of ways of approaching God. It should not be difficult to stir the child's mind about causes; indeed, it is already interested in them as it is in purposes.

The justification of our religious experience is possible only to those who have had a religious experience; but to the adolescent with his conflicting experience of the world, his consciousness of the contradiction of evil, his sense of failure and sin, the attempts to base religion with Dr. Rashdall on the moral "ought," or with Dr. Waterhouse and Dr. Edwards on the values to life that religious quest has brought, may be extremely useful.

Belief in Christ

To a very large extent the belief in God or a supreme Being is universal, though the belief may never have given rise to a religious sentiment in the true sense of the term. But it is very different when we come to the specific elements in the Christian Faith. What is it, psychologically, that justifies and sustains the belief that Christ is the incarnation of God, that He is the Saviour of the world? Here again it must be emphasised that the psychologist cannot justify beliefs, but only account for them. That there are a vast number of people whose faith in God is wrapped up in their faith in Christ goes without saying. Many have believed on authority of Church or Bible; others have

found in Him their justification of their ideas of God and His relationship to men.

It is only possible to give a very brief outline of the reasons which have satisfied men on these points; but they are extremely interesting from the psychological point of view, whatever they be to philosophers and historians.

Dr. Martineau once said that we could never think of God in moral terms except in the likeness of Jesus Christ. Try to conceive God, and you will find yourself thinking in terms of Christ. We seem to be unable to get beyond Him, at least, when we think of God's relation to us.

Probably this is the fundamental reason amongst educated men for their belief in Christ as the Son of God. He has, if we may use the expression of Professor H. R. Mackintosh, "the value of God" to the soul. What Christ was, God eternally is. A man comes to rest on Christ because in Him he finds all he needs of God. "More than all in Thee I find." It may be that such men cannot enter into the deep questions about the relationship of Christ to God; or decide that if He was the Son of God what is His relationship to our humanity; but they are convinced of His Sonship, of His revelation of God, because He satisfies every moral demand about God. It is true they do not rest on that argument alone, but it is probably this that psychologically grips them.

The Self-Consciousness of Jesus

It may be sufficient here to outline the justification that Dr. Mackintosh gives in a small volume written

for students. The same writer has a large volume on the *Person and Work of Christ*, to which readers interested in how Christians come to justify their belief in Christ may be referred. I choose the smaller because I am writing for those not versed in the philosophical ideas on which the deeper arguments are based, and because this volume is written for teachers who will have to help the growing mind to justify the beliefs which they come to hold.

First, then, there is the self-consciousness of Jesus Himself. He undoubtedly believed He was the Messiah, the deliverer of His people. The controlling idea in the mind of Jesus was that He was sent from God ; and psychologically this would explain the lack of doubt and the note of authority in His teaching. So sure was He of His unique task, and the Divine authority which had invested Him, that He demanded absolute loyalty from His disciples, and acted and taught as if He believed that His greatest task was in pointing men to Himself. *He did not speak in the name of God merely, but as God :* " I say unto you " ; " He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." He forgave sins, and yet seems to have had no need to ask forgiveness for Himself ; He was conscious of no sin. He felt that as Messiah He had come to found the Kingdom of God. What is more, He undoubtedly connected His death with His work. Was He utterly mistaken ? That seems to be the alternative to the position, " that He was the Person on whom everything in religion turned, completely covering our relation to God." From the self-consciousness of Jesus, His teaching regarding Himself and God, the

tremendous claims He made for Himself, in addition to the miracles, etc., it is felt that He is what the Church has thought Him to be—the Son of God.

The Christ of Experience

But no less sustaining for Christian faith is the experience of Christ that the Church, or those who make up the Church, have had. Their experience of forgiveness of sin, their power to overcome the world, their strength to fulfil great tasks, they attribute to Him. Some one has said that the true Christian Apologetic is the Christian man; but the Christian man attributes all that he is to Christ—the risen Christ in the heart. His presence, says Dr. Mackintosh, is a *felt presence.* To such He is not a problem that History can solve; His felt presence is experienced in the heart of believers *now*; His present power in their lives demands explanation. They feel that it is He who makes them at one and keeps them at one with God. In fulfilling what they believe to be His will, they believe they are fulfilling God's will. All this, it is urged, demands His unique relation to God; demands that God was in Christ; that He was with the Father from the foundation of the world.

There can be no doubt that whatever the psychologist may think about the explanations and interpretation of Christian experience, that experience is as real as the normal religious experience of which the psychologist takes cognizance. That much Professor James recognised. It may be argued that not every religious man has this experience of Christ; and that

may be true, but psychologically it would not invalidate the argument, as we do not doubt men have experience of colours, though colour-blind people may deny there are any colours except their dim greys.

But we have nothing to do here with the arguments from the point of view of their validity ; we are interested in how men come to justify and sustain their beliefs in Christ. For the teacher these are important as guides as to how the beliefs he or she desires to get home can be rationally based and thus become a permanent part of the religious sentiment and determine the experience of God and religious behaviour. It may be that in the Christian experience there is much that can only get an emotional justification—the mystic's experience of forgiveness, for example ; yet it is important to remember, as Professor Pratt has pointed out, that it is never merely emotional. The experience always possesses meaning, and thus has some ideational content, and the ideational content reacts on the experience itself and determines the behaviour.

Space will not allow us to pursue further the justification of beliefs. But it cannot be emphasised too often that it is only the beliefs, that we can justify to ourselves either because of their emotional content, or their rational basis, that really influence us and give content to the religious sentiment, helping to control it, and determining the behaviour it prompts. Teachers would do well to pursue the subject further than I have been able to carry it. When we speak of sentimentalism in religion we mean emotional experiences that are cut off from the rational side of our nature,

and to that extent are not controlling factors nor controlled. When we speak of appealing to the reason, we do not mean that we should approach the subject in a cold, abstract way ; it is doubtful if the scientist could do that. We do mean that at all times the reasonableness of the truth we are urging should not be shirked. Reason and feeling are not antagonistic. The latter sustains us in our search for truth. The scientist loves truth, has a strong instinct of curiosity which always involves the emotion of wonder. He experiences what he is studying through one or other of the sense organs ; but just because his reason bids him seek the interconnection of things he experiences, he never jumps to hasty conclusions. Feeling, we must remember, cannot supply religious belief with its content. Its function is to give it strength so that the beliefs will be transmuted into active attitudes to life and to behaviour. He is a wise teacher who in rousing feelings can help the pupil to realise the reasonableness of ideas that have awakened such feelings.

Children's Doubts

Especially should the teacher remember that doubts sometimes begin early. Ask your scholars from ten to fourteen what they believe about prayer, immortality, and God's care for us, and you may get a shock at the answers. Doubt is not a bad thing ; it may be the means to a deeper understanding of religion. It is only bad when it is accepted too easily or as an excuse for indifference. So question your scholars that they may become discontented with their doubts ; explore *with* them, not instead of them,

the difficulties and doubts that most children meet. In this way you will not merely keep them interested during the lesson, but will be laying a permanent interest in religious truth, and deepening their experience of God.

CHAPTER VIII

IMAGINATION AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

WE are all very familiar with the imaginative capacities of the child; but a good deal of contradictory exhortation is given to the teacher as to the use that should be made of imagination. Some lecturers tell us that we do not use the child's power of imaging enough. Dr. Montessori, on the other hand, deprecates its encouragement as tending to perpetuate the child's primitive credulity in myth and tale, and would confine its use to dealing with data that are based on truth and reality. The kind of imagination exercised by positive science is her ideal, though she does not wholly exclude the artistic imagination.

It is impossible to enter here into the controversial aspects of the question, but it will help us to take an attitude for ourselves if we clearly distinguish between the various kinds of imagination, and see how far imagination is a real need of the child, and how far it may be made an ally of the teacher.

Imagination is a Process

Imagination is a process rather than a faculty or entity. I think of the village where I spent my holidays last year, and at once I have in consciousness

an image of the streets, the shore, the house where I stayed, and some of the people whom I met there. I think of the golf match I played this afternoon, and I get an image of the muscular movements through which I sliced a ball. Imaging, then, simply means the process whereby I re-present to consciousness some past experience, or some remote and absent object by means of images. A young child's mental life must be just a stream of mental images; later the child will not even have to produce the image of the object, but just the word that names the object—that is, the verbal or symbolic image. All the images we produce in consciousness are dependent on past experience; we cannot produce anything at will. If it is just the past experience we desire to produce in consciousness, or some object we have seen before, the image is truly called a memory image.

Kinds of Imagination

Imagination, as popularly understood, means more than this. The images are combined, altered, or manipulated so as to give us a whole which we have never experienced. Dreams are good examples of images, altered and drawn from different experiences and combined into an artistic whole. They belong to what is called *passive* imagination; they are not under the control of consciousness, though they may be dominated by a motive. Day-dreams and self-phantasy are of the same nature. They come into consciousness with hallucinatory vividness, so that we may experience the same kind of emotions as if they were real experiences.

There is also what is called *active* imagination. This is producing images for some definite conscious purpose. A child comes home late from school. If he has learned from past experience that his mother becomes very cross with him for this, or slaps him, he will roll off a long story of an accident that never happened; of running an errand for some old woman; or some other tale of his own creation. He may even come to create phantasies of himself as an Indian, a soldier, a tram-conductor, etc. It is not the play-suit that makes him an Indian; it is his capacity for creating concrete images which are accompanied by emotions that give him pleasure.

Hence in imagination proper we have not merely the creation of images, either passively or actively, of remote objects or past experiences, but a combining, a rearranging, an altering of our images until they become an artistic whole. Some writers would call this kind of imagination *fancy*; and in popular speech it is so called, because the artistic whole that fancy has created has no reality in fact. So long as we realise that fancy is a species of imagination, and that all imagination is not all "fancy," it is probably well to keep this designation for it. There is what Professor Green has called "a wild ranging of the mind" that may have little or no relation to actual fact.

In his *Psychology of Education*, Dr. Drever has made a very useful distinction between *Pragmatic* and *Æsthetic* imagination. "The constructive activity which projects and designs a great bridge or canal, which formulates a new mathematical principle, or an epoch-making scientific hypothesis can obviously be distinguished from the constructive activity which

produces a great poem, novel, or work of art; and the distinction is one which cuts deep into our whole intellectual life. We can best express the distinction by calling the one kind of activity '*pragmatic*' and the other '*æsthetic.*' "

This distinction is specially valuable, as it helps us to see the kind of imaging activity in which danger lies to the child, and the kind of imagination we must help our scholars to cultivate. Dr. Drever's paragraphs on the characteristics of each kind will help us here.

Pragmatic imagination is characterised (1) By the fact that we have a feeling of perfect control over our images, that we are conscious of an end towards which our imaginative activity is directed. This practical end demands that the manipulation of our images shall be in harmony with the conditions of real existence. The imagination that constructs a bridge must take into account the laws of gravitation; the imagination that builds a hypothesis to explain a number of facts must keep in touch with the facts to be explained. The imagination of the statesman who constructs some scheme for International Peace must keep in touch with a number of political, economic, and racial facts, and indeed with the facts of human nature, else his scheme will be what is called *Utopian.*

(2) " Following from this, the activity itself, however much pleasure it may yield the individual in the process, always derives its main value and significance from the result to be achieved."

Æsthetic imagination, on the other hand, has the following characteristics: (1) The constructive manipu-

lation of the images is essentially free. The novelist desires a certain result, a certain kind of ending to his story, but the manner of getting that result he determines, at least within very wide limits.

(2) " The activity has as its end the emotional satisfaction which it yields. Its value is thus in itself, and is independent of any system of objective values."

Now it is in relation to the second kind of imagination that controversy has arisen. The child with a power of producing vivid, concrete images experiences a great deal of emotion with them. Hence he may find it easier to " imagine " himself somebody rather than to be somebody. He may even prefer to imagine himself somebody than to put forth the effort to be somebody. This is the self-phantasy of which the medico-psychologist speaks. The child may come to love his unreal world, which is much less harsh and exacting than the real. It is quite possible for the child to compensate himself for some bad habit by a phantasy of his goodness; all self-righteousness is sustained by phantasy. We may find out our own self-phantasies if we just try to catch what we are thinking about when we are not thinking at all; that is to say, what images of ourselves and our importance come into our mind when our thoughts are not being directed by some conscious end.

It is this æsthetic imagination that is the danger; and it is this type of imagination that Dr. Montessori suspects. But we cannot condemn a process simply because it has dangers and temptations. We do not condemn our instincts because they are the source of most of our temptations. Knowledge and education are dangerous things. Knowledge to a scoundrel

makes him more of a scoundrel. Because an educated rogue can do much more evil than an uneducated one, we do not on that account condemn education or knowledge.

Imagination and Ideals

As a matter of psychological fact we are dependent for our ideals and moral advances on imagination. We are dependent on our power to help the child to image goodness, and to experience what goodness "feels like," we rely on the child's capacity to imagine. Just as the function of play is to prepare the child for actual life, so the myth, the tale, the imaginative story have for their function the inducing by imagination of the sympathetic tendency which will thus be the more easily aroused when actual need comes; especially if the sympathy aroused by tale, myth, or story gets some real active outlet from the first. Again the fact that the child has a tendency to identify himself with one or other of the characters of a story is of great significance. The identification of himself with the hero means that he will experience something of the emotion of the hero, and that may leave a real desire to be one and to act like one.

What we have to remember, then, in regard to imagination in religious education is, that in the case of the young child we should attempt to rouse concrete images in preference to verbal images; for the latter may be accompanied with weakly toned emotion. Dr. Drever believes that education should prevent the power for concrete images from being swamped by book-learning which has the tendency to hasten the day when mostly verbal images are produced. Some lose

entirely the power to construct concrete images. Dr. Rivers tells us he had practically none. Certainly we should be on the look out for any tendency in the child to substitute phantasy for reality; but do not let us cast aside a process which is of great value in religious education and moral education, because a few children have put it to a morbid use.

Let us turn now to the real value of imagination in moral and religious education. "The function of the image," says Drever, "is to make past experience available for present use, and to some extent to define the future event beforehand." On the moral side this makes imagination an admirable ally of the teacher. Few children but experience the feeling of having done wrong, sorrow for having done it; and, handled delicately, the imagination can use this experience as a strong inhibiting factor in the growing life. "My sins are ever before me," said the Psalmist. That was no utterance of a morbid spirit. Such a feeling is totally different psychologically from the fear of the consequences of wrong-doing. This latter is not a healthy motive, and shows that the desire to do the wrong is only inhibited, not destroyed. It may be there as an unconscious motive held in leash by fear. But sorrow that we should have done the wrong, shame that the action should have been ours, is one of the healthiest feelings we can have, and is the true guarantee of repentance. It is this feeling which our moral appeal to the imagination of the growing child and adolescent should arouse, both to prevent sin and to induce true repentance. By the same process we can help the growing mind to anticipate the shameful feelings and sorrow that will follow some immoral

act. Many an adolescent who cannot get rid of his temptations is kept strong by his innate power of imagining what he will feel like if he succumbs to temptation.

But the æsthetic imagination is the source of our ideals. Can we not present Christ so as to appeal to this kind of imagination? Was it not in virtue of this kind of imagination that Paul could speak of the same mind that was in Christ Jesus dwelling also in him? But to rouse this kind of imagination it is the concrete Christ of History and experience that must be presented. It is not merely that the growing mind will see the ideal to be attained; it will also have a foretaste of what it "feels" like to be as He was. The Kingdom of God should be presented by the arousal of concrete images. Then the contrast between the ideal and the actual will be felt, not merely perceived in verbal images which may have little or no emotion accompanying them. As verbal images the evils and conditions of the world create little or no action to remove them; but present them so that they are felt, and action—and sometimes real passionate action—on behalf of the Kingdom will follow. It is here we get the difference between the doctrinaire social reformer and the Labour man. The latter through his concrete images experiences real emotion when he thinks of the unemployed, the strikers, the ill-housed, etc. His passion and enthusiasm are not born of ignorance of economic facts, though his remedies may be; they are generated by this capacity to image his own past experience, to make it available for the purpose of feeling real sympathy, to experience vividly what a future without the incessant fear of

poverty and ill-health would be like to those for whom he pleads. Remember this capacity does not in itself guarantee that he offers the true remedy; it only accounts for the difference in feeling and enthusiasm. An illustration might have been used from the Church. The difference between the cold intellectual member of the Church and the simple evangelical preacher is that Christ is experienced in concrete images by the latter, but is imaged in words or abstract relations by the former.

Moral Value of Pragmatic Imagination

It is through the æsthetic imagination that we re-live history. An historical religion like ours needs the æsthetic imagination if the prophets are to be understood, and the environment of early Christianity envisaged.

But not of less value is the pragmatic imagination. Ideals need means; and whether the ideal be the "stature of the manhood of Christ Jesus," or the social ideal of the Kingdom of God, means have to be devised and the pragmatic imagination must be roused. Let it be understood that no antagonism is implied in what has been said between knowledge and imagination. It is not an ideal born of the "fancy," but the concrete one seen in Jesus that must be presented. Nor is it a kingdom of Utopian qualities that we must present, but a society dominated by the principles and the *ethos* of the New Testament. Apart from the pragmatic imagination there is no means by which we can envisage the structure of such a society as the Kingdom implies. A quotation from Drever used in

another connection is applicable here: "In the formulation of ends, in the conscious utilising of past experience in order to discover means, in the arrangement of means and mode of procedure for the attainment of ends, in the extension of the limits of our concrete experience beyond the possibilities of direct sense perception, we are dependent on the pragmatic form of imaginative activity."

Imagination and Beliefs

Space will not allow us to follow further the use of imagination in the attainment of moral ideals; but something must be said as to how it can be used for the understanding of the beliefs of Christianity and the theory of the universe that is implied in the Gospel.

Many of the children in Sunday schools experience difficulty with much that is found in our Bible. The adolescent, also, finds difficulty with the story of creation, the origin of the Tables of the Law, the cruelties attributed to God in the Old Testament narratives. Here both the pragmatic and æsthetic imagination may come to the teacher's aid. The story in Genesis is often spoken of as a story conveying a great truth. As a story it does manifest a magnificent æsthetic imagination on the part of the writer. But it is more accurately described as partaking of both the æsthetic and pragmatic imagination. It is first and foremost a hypothesis to explain the world in which the writer found himself, the variety of living things he found in it, the two sexes, the fact of evil and death in the world. Imagine yourself stripped

of all the scientific knowledge which is the inheritance of the age in which we live, but still as intelligent as you are now—for that was the state of this writer; imagine further that you were confronted with the same phenomena without our present knowledge; suppose yourself seeking some explanation for it all, could you conceive a more brilliant explanation than this writer gave with the knowledge he had? I confess I cannot. I am not now concerned with the scientific accuracy of his explanation, but with the æsthetic and pragmatic imagination that gave birth to this "hypothesis" concerning the origin of life, man, woman, the soul, sin, the toil and struggle of life.

Suppose you were confronted with the task of finding a moral sanction for laws which you believed could alone make a nation; or suppose that you had seen those laws make a strong nation, could you explain their power and Divine origin better than by saying that He wrote them and gave them to a traditional character revered throughout that nation? These men were actuated, as our philosophers and scientists are, by a desire to explain the facts of life. They were actuated, as all moral reformers have been, by the desire to find sanctions for the reforms they wished to see. Like them, they used their imagination; they had to travel beyond the known to the unknown.

The psychologist is not concerned with the truth or accuracy of the explanations of phenomena given by these writers; but he may be concerned to help the teacher to interest her or his scholars in the facts which these writers tried to explain. The scholars need to be interested in the same facts, the same moral problems, if they are to have a serious attitude to life. How

better interest them than by helping them to use their imagination to realise the problems that faced the men of old, and the spiritual explanations they gave of them? The vital thing for the teacher is not that the scholars should accept the explanations given by these writers, but that they should become conscious of the facts; and thus, through their own æsthetic and pragmatic imagination, arrive at beliefs or explanations for themselves in harmony with their greater knowledge.

So, too, with the great problems concerning the Person and work of Christ. Here again the legitimate use of both types of imagination is necessary for belief. It is in virtue of our imagination that we think of God as Father. Set the pragmatic and æsthetic imagination of your scholars working on the facts of the Bible, the Christ, the Church, the fact of sin, etc., and they will not rest until they find an intellectual content for their religious sentiment. By that same imagination we can carry our scholars through the various books of the Old and New Testaments with the growing conviction of a progressive Revelation and a deeper desire to understand it.

CHAPTER IX

THE SUNDAY SCHOOL

SOMETHING must be said in this final chapter of the Sunday school, which plays such an important part in religious education. Steadily it is reaching a very high efficiency; schools are being graded; teachers are being trained; aids and helps to the understanding of the child mind and the Holy Scriptures are within reach of the teacher, through the medium of the religious weeklies and specialised Sunday-school helps.

Not a little of the finer organisation and efficiency of our Sunday schools is due to the enthusiasm and activities of Mr. Geo. Hamilton Archibald, the principal of Westhill Training College—a college that has sent into Sunday-school work some splendid workers.

The Sunday school has now a recognised place among the agencies that lay the foundations of character; and amongst the numerous other agencies not one of them could take its place in the making of religious character. It is through the work of the Sunday school that the religious sentiment becomes permanent in many lives. By its teaching the sentiment gains that ideational content that makes it such a strong factor in behaviour. It is the greatest evangelising institution in the world, and though one would

not belittle the fine religious teaching in many of our day schools, it is to the Sunday school we must look for the interpretation of religious knowledge in terms of religious experience and life. To a very large extent our Churches are recruited from its departments, and most Christian workers owe their enthusiasm in the work of the Church to what they learned in the school. *The Church needs the school.*

Sunday-School Decline

Nevertheless, with all this efficiency the numbers of scholars in recent years have been rapidly declining. It is just because the Church needs the school so much that these decreasing numbers must cause grave anxiety in the minds of those who have the Church and State at heart. Only a very small percentage of those who leave our schools before adolescence ever become interested in the Church, and the percentage of those who leave at adolescence without joining the Church is very high.

Parents' Responsibility

There can be little doubt that the modern parent is mostly responsible for the decrease in the enrolment of the younger children. To a large extent they are responsible also for the failure of the older children to remain and become interested in religion. As was said in the chapter on religious education and the home, the lack of all expressive religious acts in the home gives the child no chance to experience religious

emotions; the numinous disposition has never been stimulated; curiosity has never been aroused; the child's imagination never has had a chance to work on the Christ to whom the mother prays, and of whom the father never speaks The result is that when the child comes to Sunday school there is no unconscious religious interest to which our teaching and lessons can appeal; he has little or no religious experience that urges him to a conscious interest. A fictitious interest may be created by the prizes and the treats, and this fictitious interest is not to be despised psychologically, since it keeps the child where there is a chance of religious interest being created.

Method and Content of Lesson

But the failure of the Sunday school cannot all be laid at the door of the parents; some of it may belong to the school. I am not so sure that the emphasis on the understanding of the child mind and in the methods of presenting our lessons has been all gain. In response to ever-repeated appeals to "make our lessons interesting," there has been a tendency to forget the *content* of the lesson; and that is fatal to the building up of a permanent, stable religious sentiment. This is no indictment of the interesting lesson; but it is an indictment of the lesson that is subordinated to all sorts of stories and illustrations. Our function is to interest the child in religion through the lesson. If his interest stops with the lesson our labour has been in vain; indeed, it has been more than in vain: it has been positively dangerous. We may create an

appetite for the story and illustration, and a corresponding impatience and even distaste for the knowledge and ideas that these were supposed to bring home. Dr. Drever has pointed out the dangers of this in day-school teaching. He says: "The teacher who always tries to make school work interesting by effort on his part to attract the pupils to attend by means of story, illustration, picture, and, in short, all the tricks of the 'show lesson,' not merely develops mental 'flabbiness' in these pupils, but also develops the 'appetite' for such lessons, an appetite which fastens upon the pleasant, amusing, and enjoyable parts of the lesson, is impatient of everything not coming under these categories, and ends in a 'craving' for the mere amusement, which becomes more and more fastidious and difficult to satisfy, and which is accompanied, on the intellectual side, by a greater and greater tendency towards passivity in the mere enjoyment of the experience."

It might be well to ask ourselves, what definite idea do I want to leave in the mind of my scholars by this lesson? What purpose is this illustration or story fulfilling in relation to that idea I desire to get home? Illustration should excite some native or acquired interest which can then be directed towards the end we have in view by the lesson. The thing to remember here is that method must be subordinate to the aim which we have in teaching.

Choice of Teachers

Another thing from the psychological point of view which concerns us is the teacher. We have seen that

the child "catches" religion from the manner in which religion is taught. The child senses the sincerity of the teacher, the interest of the teacher in getting the lesson home—in a word, how much he cares whether the child becomes interested or not.

It is what Religion means to us that tells

A great deal can be said for putting the elder scholars into the Primary Department without probing too deeply into their motives for wishing to go, so long as the leaders are of known ability, and their religious experience definite. Many come to have faith through works; and the guidance of the leader here in the training-class may lead the young teacher with no decided religious tendency into the clear conscious service of the Master. But even here there is a danger. It is a great thing for the teacher to be interested in the children; but it is a much greater thing from the teaching point of view if the teacher is also clearly conscious of the need of religion in the child's life, and has some vision of what religion means for character. I am afraid there is great vagueness in the minds of superintendents concerning the qualities they should look for in deciding whether an elder scholar is capable of work among the children. Teachers should be chosen with great care, and for the junior and senior grades only those with strong religious sentiment.

Relation of School to Church

We have said that the Church needs the school. The function of the Church is to transmit the Gospel,

to embody the life and meaning of our Lord, and transmit that life and meaning to the coming generation as much as to witness to the present generation. The school thus becomes the field of the intensive work of the Church. But no less does the school imply and need the Church. The school has little or no meaning apart from the Church; the Church completes and gives a sphere for the energy generated by the religious sentiment. The school needs the Church to complete its own meaning. Indeed, it needs the Church to sustain it while fulfilling its function, and to give that function permanent meaning.

This is not seldom forgotten. Some schools are almost apart from the Church; and from the point of view of religious education this is to be unreservedly condemned. A school that does not consciously keep in mind the need for a Church in which the religious sentiment will be sustained and used must fail of its function. The school cannot encompass the whole function of religious education; it only begins it.

Creation of Church Consciousness

Hence not a little part of the function of the Sunday school is the creation of a *Church Consciousness*. The religious man can never be a mere individual; he must be a *corporate individual*; he must be a member of the specific group whose very meaning lies in its function of sustaining religion in the individual and transmitting it to society. It is not enough for the child to have a school consciousness; the Church

consciousness should include the school consciousness. In many cases it begins with it, but it should transcend it.

One of the defects psychologically of the graded school is the tendency for the school to be cut into departments that are to some extent self-contained; the departments open separately, and close separately, and only meet together occasionally. I cannot but think that this is a mistake psychologically. A group consciousness can only be created in the group. It is a great thing for a child to feel that he belongs to the school in which there are many much older than himself. Otherwise he is apt to have no group consciousness, or a consciousness of his department only.

If we take the Public Schools where the group consciousness is strong, we find that many of the schools now allow the boys to stay in the same house during their whole stay in the school. The young and old thus come to feel that they belong to the same group. Again prayers are taken together in the mornings, and chapel on the Sunday evening is invariably a service at which all have to make their appearance. Religion is a social affair as well as an individual affair; indeed, writers such as Durkheim define religion in social terms alone. Worship is social, however important private worship may be.

It is this social side of religion that the meeting of the departments is apt to undermine, and I am not so sure but it has much to answer for the failure of our scholars to go forward to the Church. The school consciousness is not likely to be strong, if there are

long intervals between the school meeting as a whole, and the Church consciousness gets little chance to grow. Neither logically nor psychologically does the meeting of the school as a whole Sunday by Sunday contradict the graded idea. It is the classes that need to be graded; but the school ought to be a psychological entity. The school ought to be more than an aggregate of individuals or classes, or departments. Just as the group consciousness and *esprit de corps* in our Public Schools have done much for the national consciousness, so the school consciousness may do much to help the growth of Church consciousness. Probably the strongest Church consciousness is that of the Roman Catholic and the Scottish Presbyterian; and both these great Churches have wielded an influence on political and social life as corporate groups greater than any other Churches. We are not concerned whether that influence has always been good or evil; the point is that it is wielded. To-day when the very structure of the State and society is composed of various groups, all contributing their quota to the formation of public opinion, and vitally influencing social and political movements, it behoves the Church to see that the group consciousness of her members is strongly developed, so that when religious opinion is needed as conscience or guide in society it will be felt.

The Family Pew

One cannot but regret the passing of the "family pew." It was there the strong Church consciousness was created. Doubtless the services were a weariness to the children; but was there nothing gained for

character and religion by having to sit reverently through the long service? Is it not Professor James who says somewhere that to learn to sit still is as positive in character formation as action? It is a great thing to have the children in Church, and it is greater still that we have managed to get them away from the gallery to the front seats. Doubtless the children's Churches do a world of good also, but nothing can take the place psychologically of the old family pew, both in making the religious experience something shared by the whole family, and the corporate part the family was felt to take in the Church life, but above all in the formation of that strong Church consciousness through which the children came to feel the tides of the Church at large flooding their being. It was in this way that there was created a loyalty, a love for the Church analogous to that patriotism which has done so much for the nation.

It must be borne in mind, then, that a good school will always have aims beyond itself. It will see the Church as the mother of us all, and for her sake the school will see that all her services, her classes, her teachers, have steadily in mind the transition of the adolescent to the larger sphere of Church membership. Long before that time comes the school will be forming a Church consciousness. It will be helping the growing child to feel the beat of the soul of the Church, helping the child to see the Church as worthy of his greatest service, his deepest affections, his strongest loyalty. Thus when he comes to enter the Church as a member, he will feel he is entering the most comprehensive group in society; one with the greatest part to play in social and political affairs;

one that though it must never become, or try to become, the mind of the State, must always be the conscience of the State as well as of society; one whose honour his own life must not tarnish; one whose corporate existence and influence are dearer to him than his own life.

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